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5.1  Introduction 
This paper explores the sources, patterns, and consequences of  Japanese 
foreign investment (FI) in the Pacific Asian region. My principal question is 
whether and how this investment promotes regional linkages among Japan and 
the two major groups of developing capitalist countries in East Asia: the newly 
industrialized countries (NICs), which include South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore; and four members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), which include Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Thailand.' I define Japanese FI  broadly to include not simply foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the form of equity participation in overseas ventures, but 
also the intermediate forms of FI, such as technology agreements, licensing, 
and machinery sales that yield knowledge-based assets (Markusen 1992, 3 1; 
see also Lipsey 1992,277). 
East Asian regionalism has at least three dimensions: a dynamic division of 
labor brought about in large part by foreign trade and investment, a set of coun- 
tries exhibiting increasingly common institutional characteristics, and a re- 
gional organization. This paper emphasizes regionalism in the first two senses. 
My principal argument is that East Asia is becoming a product-based region, 
one in which Japanese-style institutions show signs of extensive diffusion. De- 
velopment of a regional division of labor and common production-related in- 
stitutions has outpaced the growth of ASEAN or other regional organizations. 
This progress varies, however, across the region. 
Richard F.  Doner is associate professor of political science at Emory University. 
He wishes to thank Alasdair Bowie, Miles Kahler, Greg Noble, Eric Rarnstetter, Danny Unger, 
1.  ASEAN also includes Singapore and Brunei. 
and participants in the NBER conference for useful comments. 
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The argument proceeds in five major steps. Section 5.2 examines and largely 
confirms  the  argument  that  Japanese investment has promoted a “dynamic 
multitier catch-up process” in which the eight countries have become increas- 
ingly part of a regional division of labor (e.g., Lo, Song, and Furukawa 1989). 
I first examine the broad outlines of Japanese (as well as U.S. and NIC) FDI 
in the region, and then describe structural changes in the national economies 
and  the  evolving  trade  and production  interdependencies.  Considering  the 
weak evidence for a regional trading bloc in this volume’s other papers, the 
argument here suggests the emergence of a region that is outward-oriented in 
terms of trade and increasingly integrated in terms of production. 
Section 5.3 addresses the supply side of Japanese investment flows to the 
Pacific Asian region. It explores the position of East Asia within Japan’s global 
investment targets and argues that. despite a relative cut in Japanese funds to 
the region and a global move away from investments in manufacturing, Japa- 
nese FI  will continue to promote upgrading  in the region’s economies and a 
shifting division of labor. This process has been encouraged by  the political 
economy of structural changes in the Japanese economy itself, and by institu- 
tional mechanisms through which Japanese FI flows. 
In section 5.4 I take this institutional focus one step further and explore the 
impact of Japanese investment on domestic institutions of recipient countries. 
Most observers acknowledge that Japan owes much of its industrial success to 
production  innovations  such as  “lean  production”  systems  (Womack et al. 
1990; see also Yamashita  1991b). Such innovations involve a whole range of 
cooperative arrangements ranging from “trust-based”  subcontracting to busi- 
ness associations, trading companies, and corporatist-like public-private-sector 
bodies. These can be considered part of the knowledge-based assets Japanese 
multinationals bring to the region. Section 5.4 explores whether and to what 
extent such Japanese practices have indeed spilled over into Asian host coun- 
tries, thus linking the region institutionally. 
Section 5.5 proceeds on the assumption that the countries of East Asia are 
far from passive recipients of FT.  They have developed institutions, private as 
well as public, to resolve the collective action problems involved in screening 
and absorbing the managerial and technological components of FI. This sec- 
tion thus examines this host country side of the equation-the  varying national 
and regional approaches to and capacities for FI management. This focus helps 
to explain the different national positions within the regional development hi- 
erarchy. It also illustrates the weakness of regional responses to FI and sug- 
gests that, where such responses emerge, they are consisterlt with the develop- 
ment of  an investment-driven regional division of labor. 
The preceeding issues are of course important for the United States in both 
security and economic terms. Section 5.6 reviews the implications of Japanese 
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5.2  Japanese FDI and the Regional Division of Labor* 
5.2.1  Cumulative Flows 
Japanese direct investment in East Asia trailed that of the United States until 
1977, when cumulative totals of both countries were roughly $6 billion. This 
rough parity disappeared  in subsequent years as a flood of Japanese  invest- 
ments exceeded even the threefold  growth  of  U.S.  funds.3 On a cumulative 
basis, Japan is now the most important source of FDI in the region. Japan is 
the primary investor in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, and the second 
most important source of FI in Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and Singapore (tables 5.1-5.6). 
It is true that the share of Japan’s investment going to the Asian developing 
countries actually dropped during the latter  1980s. Up to 1980 the NICs and 
ASEAN-Four had  accounted for 25  percent  of  Japanese FI.  That portion 
dropped to roughly  12 percent of reported flows between  1986 and 1988, and 
the region’s share of cumulative Japanese flows fell to roughly I7  percent (table 
5.7). However, the absolute volume of Japanese capital going to developing 
Asia has increased  significantly, in  part as a function of the broader general 
growth of Japanese overseas investments.” Cumulative Japanese flows to the 
region (including the People’s Republic of China) increased from $5.5 billion 
in  1976 to $19.5 billion in 1985 and $32.3 billion in 1988, an almost sixfold 
increase in a twelve-year period. The NICs and ASEAN-Four accounted for 
over 90 percent of these totals. Japanese flows contributed to a steady expan- 
sion in overall FI  to the eight countries from $2 billion  in  1976-80,  to $4 
billion  in  1981-85,  and then  to $6 billion in  1986, $8 billion in  1987, $12 
billion in 1988, and $15 billion in 1988. This expansion of funds to developing 
Asia stands in marked contrast to lower and in some cases stagnating FI  in 
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East (Ramstetter 1991a, table 1). 
This expansion was also fueled by  a significant new  source of  investment 
flows-and  an important  indicator of  both changing comparative advantage 
and regional interdependence-investment  funds from the NICs. Both Malay- 
sia and the Philippines saw the relative share of their FDI from the NICs, espe- 
2. Any attempt to evaluate the relative importance of diverse FI sources in East Asia must first 
recognize the severe comparability and validity problems involved. This paper does not pretend 
to resolve these two problems. As to the first, I  hope simply to capture basic patterns of FDI, 
leaving more nuanced treatments to careful economists (e.g., Ramstetter 1992). I address the valid- 
ity issue by exploring the technological and institutional benefits of FI captured by host countries. 
For an extended discussion of these problems see Ramstetter (1991a. 10). 
3. Encarnation (1992, 176). Note that these data include investments in China and India. Given 
Japan’s minimal investments in Indiz, these inclusions do suggest patterns at variance with those 
limited to the NICs and ASEAN-Four. Further discussion of  the evolution of  Japanese FDI  is 
found in section 5.3. 
4.  For example, after remaining relatively constant in  1977-80  and rising slightly in  1980-86, 
the number of  Japanese affiliates worldwide roughly doubled from  1986 to  1988 (Ramstetter 
1991b, 30). Table 5.1  Cumulative FDI in Developing Asia by Country of Origin (percentage) 
United 
Japan  Hong Kong  States  Netherlands  Germany  India  Singapore 
Indonesia ending Dec. 1986  34.2  12.3  7.9  4.5  3.3  2.9  2.0 
Malaysia up to 1985  18.6  6.3  7.0  3.6  N.A.  N.A.  30.3 
Philippines 
Up to 1983  16.5  5.9  51.5  4.2  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
Up to  1986  15.7  6.2  54.0  4.1  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
Up to 1983  23.1  N.A.  8.9  6.2  N.A.  5.4  N.A. 
Up to 1986  20.5  N.A.  19.1  4.4  N.A.  4.2  N.A. 
Taiwan 198  1-86  20.0  N.A.  34.0  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
South Korea ending June 1987  51.6  4.3  28.6  1.5  1.6  N.A.  N.A. 
Hong Kong ending Dec. 1986  20.5  N.A.  41.2  3.7  N.A.  N.A.  1.4 
Singapore 1984  23.6  N.A.  30.0  12.8  2.2  N.A.  N.A. 
Sources: Figures for Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore are from Japan 
External Trade Organization, “Foreign Direct Investment of Japan and the Rest of the World’’ (Tokyo), as cited 
in Healey (1992). Figures for Malaysia are from Steven 1990, table 6.9; for Taiwan from Lim and Fong 1988, 
table 10. 
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Table 5.2  Cumulative FDI in Developing Asia by Country of Origin (percentage) 
Indonesia ending Dec. 1986 
Malaysia up to 1985 
Philippines 
Up to 1983 
Up to 1986 
Up to 1983 
Up to 1986 
Taiwan 1981-86 
South Korea ending June 1987 














Australia  South Korea  U.K.  France  Taiwan 
1.9  1.4  1.4  1.1  N.A. 
N.A.  0.08  17.3  N.A.  0.6 
2.0  N.A.  3.3  1.8  N.A. 
1.7  N.A.  3.4  1.5  N.A. 
1.3  N.A.  8.7  N.A.  6.2 
6.4  N.A.  5.3  N.A.  6.2 
N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A.  2.7  1.2  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A.  5.5  N.A.  N.A. 












Sources: Figures for Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore are from 
Japan External Trade organization,  “Foreign Direct  Investment of  Japan and the Rest of  the World’ 
(Tokyo), as cited in Healey (1992). Figures for Malaysia from Steven 1990, table 6.9; for Taiwan from 
Lim and Fong 1988, table 10. 
Table 5.3  Cumulative FDI in Developing Asia by Country of Origin (percentage) 
Philippines  Thailand  Switzerland  Canada  Panama 
Indonesia ending Dec. 1986 
Malaysia up to 1985 
Philippines 
Up to 1983 
Up to 1986 
Up to 1983 
Up to 1986 
Taiwan 198  1-86 
South Korea ending June 1987 

































N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
2.0  N.A. 
1.6  N.A. 
N.A.  5.4 
N.A.  3.9 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
Sources: Figures for Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore are from 
Japan External Trade Organization,  “Foreign Direct Investment of  Japan and the  rest of  the  World 
(Tokyo), as cited in Healey (1992). Figures from Malaysia from Steven 1990, table 6.9; for Taiwan from 
Lim and Fong 1988, table 10. 
cially Taiwan, grow over threefold in the 1986-90 peri~d.~  Thailand and Indo- 
nesia  experienced similar, albeit  smaller,  increases in  the  NICs’  share of 
investment flows (table 5.8). In fact, 1988 NIC investment in the ASEAN-Four 
5. At least some of the funds from Taiwan are reportedly recycled domestic capital from Malay- 
sian Chinese restricted from investments in Malaysia. This further illustrates, however, the ways 
in which the region’s economies may be gradually integrated despite legal impediments. 164  Richard F.  Doner 
Table 5.4  Cumulative FDI in Indonesia by Country of Origin (percentage) 
Gross Investment  Realized Investment, 1967-88 
Approvals, 1985-88  (forcign equity) 





































0.  I 
0.2 
4.3 
1  .5 
52.5 
Source: Adapted from Pangestu 1992, table 3.4 
Nore: Gross investment approvals are new investments and expansion. 
Table 5.5  Cumulative FDI in Taiwan by Country of Origin, 1952-86,  Share of 
Total (percentage) 
1952-60  1961-70  1971-80  1981-86  1952-86 
Total (in millions of  U.S. dollars)  35.2  523.1  2,158.7  3,211.6  5,930.2 
Overseas Chinese  29  29  37  8  21 
Foreign nationals  71  71  63  92  79 
United States  67  42  25  34  31 
Japan  4  17  17  20  23 
Europe  0  7  10  14  12 
Others  0  5  11  15  12 
Source:  Reproduced from Lim and Fong (1988, table 10). 
Note: Totals may not add up to 100 percent because of rounding. 
exceeded that of Japan and was expanding more rapidly: these four countries 
contributed 3 1 percent of new ASEAN projects compared to Japan’s 30 percent 
and increased their commitments by 334 percent compared to Japan’s 125 per- 
cent (Holloway 1989,71). Thus, as the ASEAN-Four have gained a compara- 
tive advantage in labor-intensive industries due to rising wages and currency 
appreciation in the NICs, investment from the latter has moved south (Kohama 
and Urata 1988,333). In the case of the two largest NIC investors, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, these flows have been facilitated by overseas Chinese networks.6 
6. South Korea’s low level of FDI relative to the other three NICs reflects at least two factors: 
its lack of a “Chinese connection” and the ability of the dominant chaebol to sustain higher costs 165  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
Table 5.6  Cumulative FDI in Thailand by Country of Origin, 1974-89 
(percentage) 
1974  1981  1986  1989 































































































Source: Adapted from Tambunlertchai and Ramstetter (1992, table 4.3) 
Nore: The figure for total FDI is year-end stock. 
Finally, note  that  while  U.S.  investment flows did  increase in  the  early 
1980s, they largely stagnated in the last half of the decade (table 5.9). This 
pattern results in part from the fact that developing Asia is less important for 
U.S. multinationals than it is for Japanese multinationals. For example, U.S. 
affiliates in Asia accounted for 0.5-0.7  percent of U.S. employment and 7-8 
percent of U.S.  affiliate employment worldwide, whereas the ratios for Japan 
were 0.8 percent of  employment and 50-54  percent of affiliate employment 
worldwide (Plummer and Ramstetter 1992, table 9.1). 
5.2.2  Industry Concentration 
The manufacturing emphasis of Japanese FI seems to have contributed to, 
as well as reflected, the region’s dynamic division of labor. By 1988 Japanese 
manufacturing investments had become twice the size of comparable U.S. in- 
vestments and constituted a larger share of total Japanese FDI in the region. 
This emphasis on manufacturing was not static, however; Japanese investment 
has become increasingly diversified across industries and countries, indeed 
without moving overseas due to their high levels of  R&D and financial strengths. Indeed, Lall 
argues that Korean FDI reflects “growing industrial strength rather than, as in Hong Kong or 
Singapore, domestic deindustrialization” (1 991,23). Table 5.7  Japanese FDI Abroad: Net Flows and Reported Flows 
~ 
Net Flows4  Reported Flowsh 
Total  Total  Africa and 
Year  Amount  Share  Share  Amount  share  Share  Asia Share  Share  East Share 




























62.7  37.3 
60.8  39.2 
56.7  43.3 
48.7  51.3 
49.5  50.5 
49.2  50.8 
48.4  51.6 
48.5  51.5 
59.0  41.0 
66.1  33.9 
61.8  38.2 













58.7  41.3 
40.4  59.6 
34.6  65.4 
38.8  61.2 
35.3  64.7 
39.4  60.6 
41.2  58.8 
48.5  51.5 
55.6  44.4 
41.7  58.3 
54.3  45.7 




































6.6 1984  5,965 
1985  6,452 
1986  14,480 
1987  19,519 
1988  34,210 
Average annual flows 
1972-80  1,966 
1986-88  22,736 
1965-71  207 
1981-85  5,093 
Cumulative flows 
1965-71  1,447 
1965-80  19,139 
1965-85  44,602 
1965-88  112,811 
68.1  31.9 
69.9  30.1 
78.5  21.5 
76.4  23.6 
81.2  18.8 
56.3  43.7 
52.9  47.1 
66.1  33.9 
79.3  20.7 
56.3  43.7 
53.2  46.8 
60.5  39.5 














55.1  44.9 
64.7  35.3 
66.6  33.4 
69.5  30.5 
72.0  28.0 
54.1  45.9 
44.1  55.9 
53.6  46.4 
70.0  30.0 
54.1  45.9 
45.1  54.9 
49.9  50.1 








































Source: Bank of Japan and Japan Ministry of Finance, cited in Ramstetter (199  I b,  table  I ). 
Note: Amounts in millions of US.  dollars; shares in percentage. 
"Data refer to  calendar years. 
bData  refer to fiscal years ending March 3 I of following calendar year. 168  Richard F.  Doner 
Table 5.8  Shares of FDI in ASEAN-Four, 1986-90  (percentage) 
Hong 
Total  Japan  NICs  Korea  Taiwan  Kong  Singapore  U.K.  U.S.  China 
Indonesia 
1986  100.0  39.8  27.6  1.5  2.2  11.6  12.3 
1987  100.0  36.5  11.8  1.6  0.5  9.3  0.4 
1988  100.0  5.6  36.0  4.5  20.6  5.4  5.4 
1989  100.0  16.3  25.4  9.9  3.3  8.6  3.5 
1990  100.0  13.3  34.7  6.4  8.5  15.8  4.0 
1986  100.0  6.9  15.1  0.3  0.6  3.4  10.9 
1987  100.0  34.7  28.9  0.2  11.7  4.3  12.6 
1988  100.0  25.1  32.6  0.9  17.0  6.1  8.6 
1989  100.0  31.1  41.8  2.2  25.0  4.1  10.6 
1990  100.0  12.0  54.9  0.7  48.4  3.0  2.6 
1986  100.0  28.2  9.6  0.0  0.4  9.0  N.A. 
1987  100.0  17.4  23.4  0.6  5.4  16.8  N.A. 
1988  100.0  20.3  30.0  0.4  23.3  5.7  N.A. 
1989  100.0  19.7  40.2  2.1  18.5  16.5  N.A. 
1990  100.0  37.1  31.3  1.7  23.4  5.6  N.A. 
1986  100.0  58.2  40.7  27.3  0.1  7.2  6.1 
1987  100.0  36.6  35.6  19.0  0.5  11.4  4.7 
1988  100.0  48.7  51.0  26.9  1.7  13.6  8.7 
1989  100.0  44.1  45.2  25.2  2.1  10.9  7.0 




N.A.  18.6  N.A. 
N.A.  5.0  N.A. 
N.A.  15.2  N.A. 
N.A.  7.4  N.A. 
N.A.  0.3  N.A. 
2.9  3.2  N.A. 
3.8  7.9  N.A. 
4.0  11.0  N.A. 
8.8  3.7  N.A. 
4.2  1.4  N.A. 
N.A.  28.2  2.6 
N.A.  21.6  4.8 
N.A.  32.3  5.5 
N.A.  16.3  4.2 
N.A.  6.0  2.3 
13.9  17.2  N.A. 
2.4  6.5  N.A. 
4.4  10.8  N.A. 
5.1  6.9  N.A. 
9.2  15.3  N.A. 
- 
Source: International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development Symposium, cited in Tan, 
Heng, and Low (1991, table 9) 
Table 5.9  U.S.  Outward FI to East Asia, 198689 (millions of US.  dollars) 
Average  Average 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, cited in Ramstetter (1991a, table 6). 169  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
Table 5.10  Japanese FI Distribution across Sectors 































13.5  30.2 
15.2  78.7 
10.7  55.0 
8.3  30.6 
10.2  46.2 
10.1  52.9 
0.8  11.1 
2.4  7.5 
2.4  9.06 
Source; Adapted from Ramstetter (1991b. table 3). 
more so than US.  investments (Encarnation  1992, 177-78).  Together the in- 
dustry and geographical distributions of Japanese FDI seem to mirror the re- 
gion’s evolving comparative advantage. 
Manufacturing traditionally constituted a major portion of Japanese FDI in 
the NICs, 61 percent in 1976 (table 5.10). But this portion declined to 37 per- 
cent in  1988, while other industries  (presumably  non-trade-related  services 
such as finance) became a more important focus of Japanese investment, ex- 
panding from 3  1 percent to 53  percent. Mining was never an important compo- 
nent of Japanese investment in the NICs. This shift away from manufacturing 
investments in the NICs does vary somewhat by country.’ Hong Kong, South 
Korea, and Singapore all saw the percentage of Japanese FI in manufacturing 
reduced by at least 25 percent, and in none of these three does manufacturing 
investment account for more than 52  percent of cumulative Japanese FDI (table 
5.11). In Taiwan, however, the concentration of manufacturing investment fell 
only 12 percent, with manufacturing investment accounting for 82 percent of 
all Japanese investment as of  1988. 
Unlike in the NICs, the manufacturing component of Japanese FDI in the 
ASEAN-Four has tended to expand, from 32 percent to 43 percent (table 5.11). 
Again, however, there is cross-national variation (based on Ramstetter 1991b, 
table 3). Manufacturing investment in Indonesia has increased, from 25 per- 
cent to 30 percent, but remains the lowest of the ASEAN-Four because of the 
continued large volume of funds flowing to the Indonesian petroleum sector 
(mining accounts for some 63 percent of  Japanese FI). Between  1976 and 
1988, manufacturing has risen from 57 percent to 74 percent of Japanese flows 
in Malaysia and 26 percent to 45 percent in the Philippines. The portion of 
7. This paragraph draws on data from Ramstetter (1991b. table 3). 170  Richard F.  Doner 
Table 5.11  Cumulative Reported Flows of Japanese FDI 
Manufacturing, Percentage of 
All Industries 











61.0  43.0 
6.2  8.4 
70.0  56.0 
72.0  64.0 
93.0  89.6 
31.5  35.8 
25.2  27.7 
57.6  70.3 
26.0  39.7 











Source: Adapted from Ramstetter (1991b, table 3) 
manufacturing dropped slightly in Thailand but continues to account for the 
majority of  Japanese FDI, shifting from 75 percent in 1976 to 73 percent in 
1988. 
Another indication of the role of Japanese investment in the region’s chang- 
ing structure of comparative advantage is the emphasis on what may be termed 
early, middle, and late industries. Applying Ramstetter’s data (1991b, table 3) 
to the classification developed by Lo, Song, and Furukawa (1989), trends seem 
to be the following:a For the Asian NICs, cumulative Japanese FI  shifted away 
from early  industries  toward middle and late industries between  1975 and 
1988. Much of the reduction in early-industry concentration was due to a drop 
in emphasis on textiles. The increase in the middle industry reflects growth in 
investment in the chemical industries of  Korea and Singapore. Growth in late- 
industry investments is due to increased concentration of Japanese FI in ma- 
chinery, electrical  machinery, and  transport  machinery  in  Hong  Kong  and 
South Korea and in transport machinery in Taiwan. Singapore, on the other 
hand, saw a reduced share of  investment in basic metals, machinery, electrical 
machinery, and transport machinery. Thus for the NICs, Japanese FI seems to 
have shifted further along the product cycle by first moving out of manufactur- 
ing into the service industries and by increasingly concentrating on late indus- 
tries within manufacturing. 
The most dramatic shift for the ASEAN-Four is between early and late in- 
dustries. In 1975 early industries accounted for almost 46 percent of cumula- 
8.  As presented in Lo, Song, and Furukawa (1989, 115). early industries include food, certain 
textiles, and leather. Middle industries include certain wood products, chemicals, petroleum, and 
nonmetallic products. Late industries include apparel, paper and printing, metal products, indus- 
trial and electrical machinery, and transport equipment. 171  Japanese Foreign Investment and  a Pacific Asian Region 
tive Japanese manufacturing FI, but by  1988 this had dropped to 19.3 percent, 
while the proportion of late industries rose from almost 38 percent to 66 per- 
cent in the same period. These shifts reflected a reduction in Japanese emphasis 
on textiles (as in the NICs), and country-specific growth in different manufac- 
turing industries. Indonesia saw Japanese investment in basic metals rise from 
16.9 percent of  total manufacturing investment to 47.7 percent but remained 
essentially stable across other categories. Malaysia saw the largest increase in 
electrical and transport machinery, with the former doubling its relative share 
and the latter growing from under 2 percent to over 13 percent of the total. The 
Philippines experienced a similar increase in transport-machinery investment, 
up from 4.2 percent in 1976 to 26.7 percent in 1988. Thailand saw increases in 
basic metals, machinery, and electrical machinery. Thus for ASEAN, Japanese 
investment evolved both away from mining toward manufacturing, and within 
manufacturing toward a concentration in the late industries. 
Finally, shifts in the industry distribution of Japanese FDI are reflected in 
the production of  Japanese affiliates in developing Asia.9 In  1977 Asia ac- 
counted for 42.6 percent of  Japanese manufacturing  sales worldwide, with 
roughly 27 percent of these sales in textiles and apparel, 25 percent in electrical 
machinery, and only around 11 percent in transport machinery. By  1988 Asia’s 
contribution  to  Japanese  worldwide  manufacturing  sales  had  dropped  to 
roughly one-third, but textiles accounted for only 8.4 percent of these sales, 
while the shares of  electrical machinery and transport machinery had risen 
to 34.4 percent and 22.8 percent, respectively. In  the Asian NICs, electrical 
machinery accounted for 40.4 percent of  gross sales in  1988, followed by 
transport machinery with 18.2 percent and textiles and apparel with only 7.5 
percent. In the ASEAN countries, transport machinery accounted for 25 per- 
cent of gross sales in 1988, followed closely by electrical machinery, account- 
ing for 23.3 percent, with textile and apparel accounting for 12.1 percent. 
As implied in the preceding paragraphs, the industry diversification of Japa- 
nese FDI has been accompanied by geographical diversity. In 1988 Singapore 
moved up to second place as a target of Japanese manufacturing investment. 
Yet it accounted for only one-sixth of such investment, compared to one-third 
for the United States. As a result Singapore “represents less of a regional man- 
ufacturing center for the Japanese than for the Americans.”  lo Consistent with 
the shift of Japanese manufacturing investments south to the ASEAN-Four has 
been the expanding role of Thailand: in 1988 Thailand’s manufacturing sector 
attracted more new Japanese investment than did the combined manufacturing 
sectors of the four NICs. 
5.2.3 
Broadly speaking, Japanese affiliates in East Asia have gradually become 
more export-oriented, with a trend toward greater exports back to Japan, an 
Trade Orientations of Japanese Overseas Investments 
9. This paragraph draws on data presented in Ramstetter (1991b, table 14). 
10.  Encamation (1992, 178), from which the rest of this paragraph is drawn. 172  Richard F.  Doner 
emphasis on  labor-intensive exports, and a tendency toward greater linkages 
with local sources of inputs. 
Compared to U.S. firms, Japanese investors have emphasized sales to host 
country markets rather than back to Japan or to third countries. In  1977 and 
1988 some 60 percent of Japanese subsidiary sales in East Asia went to host 
country markets, whereas the role of host country markets for U.S. subsidiaries 
dropped from roughly 40 percent in 1977 to around 23 percent in 1988. Host 
country markets accounted  for roughly 40 percent  of  sales of manufactured 
goods by U.S. subsidiaries in the region in both 1977 and 1988, compared to 
levels of some 65 percent and 60 percent for Japanese subsidiaries (Encarna- 
tion 1992, 155, 175). However, these relative figures do not reflect the signifi- 
cant absolute growth of exports by Japanese subsidiaries, especially since the 
Plaza Accord's  yen appreciation in  1985. Since then, Japanese FDI in devel- 
oping Asia has been increasingly oriented toward the exploitation of compara- 
tive advantage rather than simple maintenance of host country market. Exports 
by Japanese  affiliates in Asia expanded  over sixfold, compared to threefold 
growth for all Japanese affiliates."  The growth of manufactured exports for all 
affiliates was somewhat greater (over sevenfold) than that for Asian affiliates 
(over fivefold). 
Exports of manufactured goods by Japanese affiliates have generally empha- 
sized third-country markets over sales to the Japanese home market. But ex- 
ports to Japan did expand slightly, from roughly 7 percent in  1977 to around 
13 percent in  1988 (Encarnation  1992, 175, 181). More significant growth in 
exports to the home market has occurred in electrical  machinery  and other 
manufacturers, although even in electronics Japanese subsidiaries are less reli- 
ant on their home market than are US. affiliates. The growth of Japanese affil- 
iate exports has been most pronounced in labor-intensive industries and in the 
NICs, not in the ASEAN countries (Ramstetter  1991b, 71). This consistency 
between exports and relative factor supplies and technology levels is also seen 
in U.S. affiliates but seems to be more pronounced  for the Japanese (Lipsey 
1992, 28  1-86).  Although electronics occupies an important position in the ex- 
ports of both Japanese and U.S. affiliates, the Japanese export emphasis is re- 
portedly closer to that of local firms than is that of US.  affiliates. The Japanese 
concentration in machinery exports is not as strong as that of the United States. 
And, as noted earlier, the Japanese tend to be more concentrated in other manu- 
facturing, which includes textiles and apparel. 
As to affiliate imports and the ratio of imports to local purchases, Japanese 
trade affiliates account for a declining but still sizable percentage of imports 
from Japan, down from 85 percent to 72 percent worldwide and 54 percent to 
49 percent in Asia (Ramstetter  1991b, 80). There is a general trend toward 
lower import/purchase  ratios in Asian affiliates, whereas  these ratios stayed 
11.  Unless otherwise  noted,  information on exports  and  imports is drawn from Ramstetter 
(1991a. 1991b, especially table 20). 173  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
constant in affiliates worldwide. Importlpurchase ratios vary somewhat by in- 
dustry, being naturally higher for machinery than for food. The ratio also varies 
by  region and country. Ratios for manufacturing  affiliates in the NICs were 
“relatively  low” but “relatively high” for affiliates in the ASEAN countries 
(here including Singapore). By  1988 NIC affiliates import ratios were low in 
electrical machinery  and transport  machinery relative to affiliates worldwide 
and in ASEAN, thus suggesting that NIC affiliates “have developed more ex- 
tensive ties with local suppliers than elsewhere” (Ramstetter 1991b, 81). How- 
ever, Japanese manufacturing  affiliates  in the NICs obtained  a much larger 
portion of  their imports from Japan than did affiliates in the ASEAN coun- 
tries.Iz Finally, imports from Japan as a percentage of all Japanese manufactur- 
ing affiliate imports in Asia were high and growing, from 72 percent in 1980 
to 78 percent in 1986 and 1988. In sum, although Japan remains a major source 
of  inputs for Asian  affiliates,  the  latter have gradually increased their links 
to  host  country economies,  albeit with  significant  cross-national and cross- 
industry variation. 
5.2.4  National Structural Change and Regional Division of Labor 
There is no clear proof of a consistent relationship between Japanese invest- 
ment in Asia on the one hand and the pattern  of  comparative advantage in 
developing Asia or Japan on the other (Ramstetter 1991b, 98). That said, it is 
presumably possible at least to identify general patterns of association between 
investment flows and indicators of change in the regional division of labor. I 
proceed first by  examining structural changes in the region’s  national econo- 
mies and indicators of shifting regional comparative advantage. I then examine 
some possible causal linkages between investment, trade, labor migration, and 
shifting comparative advantage. 
The impressive changes occurring within the NICs and ASEAN-Four need 
little elaboration. Measured most crudely, the share of manufacturing in GDP 
has risen by  at least 42 percent for six of the eight countries, the exceptions 
being Hong Kong and the Philippines, both of which were at fairly high levels 
by the mid- 1960s (table 5.12). 
These structural changes have translated into shifts in comparative advan- 
tage consistent with the flying geese analogy. That model involves each country 
capturing  “increasingly  sophisticated products  from more advanced econo- 
mies, which in turn are shifting their attention to still more advanced products” 
(Petri  1992a, 54). Several kinds of evidence seem to support the flying geese 
dynamic. One is Petri’s calculation of the sophistication exhibited by the export 
bundle of different economies in developing Asia. Shifts in market shares be- 
tween 1970  and 1986 suggest considerable dynamism consistent with dynamic 
comparative advantage (Petri 1992a, 56). Petri’s general argument is reinforced 
12. Since Ramstetter’s data do not include country-specific figures, it’s unclear whether exclud- 
ing Singapore from ASEAN would make a difference (see 1991b, table 23). 174  Richard F.  Doner 
Table 5.12  Share of Manufacturing in GDP, 1965-89 



























































Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1987, cited in Lo, Song, and Furukawa (1989, 
86, table 1). 
by  evidence showing the NICs moving away from and the ASEAN countries 
moving  toward  unskilled  labor-intensive products (table 5.13; see Alburo, 
Bautista, and Gochoco 1992). 
The result has been an increasingly horizontal and intrafirm division of la- 
bor. Rather than the U.S.-European intraindustry trade driven by  demand for 
differentiated products, FDI in Asia has promoted a more vertical type of hori- 
zontal trade involving the exchange of goods within similar industries at differ- 
ent stages of assembly or processing. This is reflected in (1) the expansion of 
NIC exports to Southeast Asia (Fransman 1986a, 170-71),  (2) the expanded 
share of manufactures in Japan’s imports from the NICs and especially ASEAN 
(tables 5.14 and 5.15), and  (3) the increasing dependence of  the NICs and 
ASEAN-Four on Japan for industrial g00ds.I~  The emergence of a horizontal 
division of labor has been especially sharp in the steel and textile industries. 
According to recent MITI figures, South Korea and Taiwan account for nearly 
half of Japan’s steel imports, whereas Japan exports almost half of its higher- 
value steel and iron products to Taiwan and South Korea as well as to Singa- 
pore and the rest of ASEAN (do Rosario 1992, 38). In many cases, this re- 
gional division of  labor occurs within firms as production departments move 
abroad and R&D and planning departments are strengthened at home (Naka- 
kita  1988, 318). Indeed, Encarnation argues that intracompany trade is more 
characteristic of Japanese than of U.S. multinationals (1991,9). 
13. According to a recent MITI report, manufactured exports from the ASEAN-Four have been 
more successful in penetrating the Japanese market than those of  the NICs (do Rosario 1992,38). Table 5.13  Revealed Comparative Advantage Indexes 
Year  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Japan  Hong Kong  Korea  Singapore  Taiwan 
Unskilled labor- 
intensive  1970  N.A.  0.15  0.08  0.21  2.61  7.10  5.43  0.94  N.A. 
1976  0.01  0.29  0.84  1.29  1.38  6.91  6.06  0.94  N.A. 
1980  0.07  0.44  1.29  1.63  1.17  6.48  5.63  0.93  6.14 
1985  0.45  0.56  0.67  1.89  0.89  5.74  4.18  0.72  5.58 
Human capital- 
intensive  1970  0.02  0.12  N.A.  0.03  1.62  0.45  0.20  0.39  N.A. 
1976  0.001  0.10  0.02  0.05  2.25  0.70  0.76  0.61  N.A. 
1980  N.A.  0.12  0.05  0.13  2.42  1.23  1.19  0.51  0.81 
1985  N.A.  0.04  0.02  0.14  2.10  0.87  1.84  0.43  0.78 
Technology-intensive  1970  N.A.  0.04  0.003  N.A.  2.46  1.59  0.62  0.63  N.A. 
1976  N.A.  0.64  0.041  0.17  2.10  2.06  1.39  1.75  N.A. 
1980  0.04  0.98  0.14  0.52  2.13  1.59  1.46  1.80  1.81 
1985  0.05  1.39  0.78  0.54  2.08  1.45  1.16  1.19  1.44 
Physical 
capital-intensive  1970  0.05  0.93  0.06  0.53  1.37  0.13  1.16  0.26  N.A. 
1976  0.05  0.68  0.20  0.31  1.68  0.18  0.39  0.45  N.A. 
1980  0.12  0.58  0.25  0.65  1.80  0.23  0.74  0.56  0.43 
1985  0.24  0.40  0.42  0.23  1.50  0.44  0.53  0.59  0.48 
Source: Chen (1989). 176  Richard F.  Doner 
Table 5.14  Changes in Export and Import Structure of Japan 











































































3.6  2.6 
4.4  5.2 
10.5  8.2 
71.8  74.3 
4.4  6.9 
2.7  4.7 
3.8  2.3 
19.6  18.4 
12.0  15.5 
13.9  15.0 
43.  I  20.5 
6.2  7.9 
9.6  14.2 
I .2  1.8 
15.2  26.9 
1.1  2.5 
3.0  5.8 
31.0  49.0 
Source; Japan Tariff Association, cited in Yamazawa (1990, table 2). 
Norest Percentage of total export and import values. Manufactures subtotal is the sum of chemical, 
machinery, and other manufactures. 
Table 5.15  Share of Manufactures in Japan’s Imports 















































































Source: Institute for Developing Economies Trade Data Search System, cited in Hirata and No- 
hara ( 1989). 
Note: Manufactures include SITC less 68. 177  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
Finally, this Japanese-driven  division of labor has entailed a wave of  labor 
migration  throughout the region. Some two million  workers from East and 
Southeast Asia have left home to take work, not just as domestic helpers or 
unskilled labor, but as accountants and machine tool operators and cooks. As 
the Japanese work force has aged and moved into higher-technology  areas, 
severe labor shortages have plagued the country’s construction and basic indus- 
tries. The Japanese work force reportedly now includes some 38,000 “trainees” 
from the region,  over  150,000 ethnic Japanese foreigners,  and  an unknown 
number of illegal entrants. A similar pattern has occurred in Taiwan and South 
Korea. In  Malaysia  some 50 percent of construction and plantation  workers 
are foreigners (mostly Indonesians), and manufacturers have begun to bring in 
foreign workers. Indonesia, itself an important source of labor flows to other 
countries, has been forced to employ Filipinos and other foreigners in white- 
collar and professional  positions. Although these flows have the potential to 
generate numerous social tensions, they will also encourage further shifts up 
the product-cycle ladder. Labor shortages will encourage countries to improve 
productivity  through technical innovation, while workers returning to South- 
east Asia from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea will constitute a source of new 
skills (“Asian Labor Shortages” 1992). 
The preceding discussion presents only the general outlines of  the ways in 
which Japanese FI influences the region’s division of labor. In fact, the impact 
will vary by industry, as well as country. The following two cases provide some 
sense of this variation. 
Textile and Apparel Industries 
The evolution  of  the region’s  textile and apparel complex is probably the 
most advanced of  all industries. Between  1968 and 1977 Japan’s total textile 
and apparel trade with East Asia increased by over twofold, but its trade sur- 
plus with them declined by roughly  one-half (Arpan, Barry, and Tho 1984). 
By 1972 textile and apparel exports of South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong 
exceeded those of Japan for the first time, and widened considerably by 1977. 
By the end of this period, Japan maintained a comparative advantage in up- 
stream and midstream activities (e.g., yarns, fibers, and fabrics) but rapidly lost 
competitiveness in apparel. The NICs, on the other hand, expanded surpluses 
in  apparel  and  began  to catch  up  with  Japan  in  synthetic  fiber  products, 
whereas the ASEAN countries gained competitiveness in apparel. 
By 1987 Japan maintained an overall surplus in textiles but experienced in- 
creased competition from the NICs. NIC textile and apparel products increased 
their penetration of Japanese markets, prompting both intensified diversifica- 
tion by  the stronger Japanese firms and demands for protection by   other^.'^ 
14.  Import penetration ratios for textile products between 1984 and 1987 went from 25.1 per- 
cent to 34.5 percent: for yam from 11.6 percent to 13.7  percent, for cloth outergarments from 23.2 
percent to 34.1 percent, and for knit outergarments from 26.7 percent to 46.7 percent (JICA 1989, 
A-111- I). On diversification see Johnstone (1988). On charges of dumping and demands for protec- 
tion, see “When Japan Is Threatened by Imports” (1988). 178  Richard F.  Doner 
The ASEAN countries, meanwhile, rapidly expanded apparel exports while 
some moved into midstream and upstream operations. Thailand, for example, 
was 100 percent self-sufficient in cloth made from synthetic fiber and 85 per- 
cent self-sufficient in synthetic yam by  the early 1970s (JICA 1989,II-1). 
From the Japanese perspective, the textile and apparel complex is perhaps 
the quintessential example of the product cycle. This relatively rapid shift in 
comparative advantage was due to at least three factors, one of which involved 
the relatively low entry barriers for Asian firms in certain sectors of the indus- 
try. A second factor was Japan’s effective restructuring of its own textile capac- 
ity and its low levels of  protection, leading to a general reduction in textiles 
position within Japanese manufacturing (JICA 1989). And finally, these re- 
gional shifts reflected Japan’s focus on East Asia as its primary focus of textile 
and apparel FI. Some 64 percent of the cases of Japanese FI in textiles between 
1955 and 1985 were in the NICs and the ASEAN-Four (UNCTC 1987, 136). 
As host country firms have expanded their own capacity, however, the Japanese 
presence seems to have de~1ined.I~  Simultaneously, textile investment from the 
NICs, especially Hong Kong and Taiwan, has expanded, in some cases bring- 
ing technology as well as capital (Tho 1988, 397). In some cases this has oc- 
curred via linkages with larger Japanese firms.I6 
Automobile Industry 
The auto industry lies at the other end of  the spectrum from textiles and 
apparel. As the share of  textiles in Japanese manufacturing and exports de- 
clined, the role of autos and auto parts grew.I7  Auto exports (parts and compo- 
nents) by the NIC and ASEAN countries expanded as well, albeit much more 
slowly and from a smaller base. The East Asian countries, especially South 
Korea and Taiwan, accounted for between 5 percent and 9 percent of Japanese 
auto part imports in 1987. However, given the very low overall level of Japa- 
nese part imports, this is not a very large volume. Also, until recently the Japa- 
nese have not had much of  an overseas manufacturing (as opposed to assem- 
bly) presence.  Preferring to  service overseas markets  through  exports, not 
offshore production, Toyota and Nissan had a combined average of only 1 per- 
15.  According to Plummer and Ramstetter (1992.250). affiliate export shares declined in Tai- 
wan and Thailand. Also, affiliate employment levels and shares of host country employment fell 
for South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
16. The prime example of this pattern is Toray’s tie-up with TAL in the  1970s. The latter, a 
Hong Kong-based textile converter, already had  subsidiaries in Taiwan and Thailand. The two 
firms established several more subsidiaries in Thailand, Hong Kong, and Malaysia and by the mid- 
1970s had  created a vertically integrated complex in the region (Arpan, Barry, and Tho, 1984, 
139). 
17. Transport equipment expanded as a percentage of total Japanese manufacturing from 5.3 
percent in 1950 to 14 percent in 1987 (Tahara-Domoto and Kohama 1989,3). Japanese exports of 
auto parts grew even more sharply, from a total of  $3.8 billion to $15.5 billion from 1980 to 1987, 
compared with an increase of US.  exports from $10.5 billion to $14.3 billion (auto parts = SITC 
732.8  [bodies, chassis, and parts]  and 71  11.5  [internal combusion  engines];  UNCTAD  1990, 
table 3). 179  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
cent of their production abroad in 1980, compared to 35 percent for the U.S. 
Big Three. And unlike U.S. firms, Japanese assemblers preferred not to export 
from their overseas plants or those of their East Asian partners (Doner 1991, 
64). Quite clearly, regional shifts in comparative advantage in the auto industry 
have been much slower than in textiles (or in electrical equipment). 
The regional production and trade of  auto products is, however, far from 
stagnant. For one thing, Japanese assemblers and parts firms have helped to 
develop a modest automotive industrial base in the region through a fairly long 
history of operation in most of the countries. Toyota was involved in an early 
joint venture in South Korea, and Mitsubishi has established a close relation- 
ship with Hyundai. Until the proliferation of Japanese transplants in the West 
beginning around 1985, the ASEAN-Four accounted for 39 percent and 35 
percent of  the overseas production bases of  Japanese assemblers and parts 
firms, respectively (Doner 1991, 72-73).  The ASEAN facilities were largely 
devoted  to  assembly. However,  host  country localization policies  and  the 
growth of spare-parts markets both at home and overseas gradually gave rise 
to local automotive industries of varying strengths. This growth was of course 
most striking in the South Korean assembly industry. Elsewhere in the region 
the emphasis was on parts production. Exports of parts and components began 
to grow in the early to mid-1980s. Some of this growth was due to initiatives 
by  local firms confronted with saturated domestic markets, especially in Thai- 
land and Indonesia. But some was a function of  initiatives by  Japanese firms 
who dominate the region’s markets and account for one-fourth of  its auto ex- 
Several interrelated factors accelerated the investment and export activities 
of Japanese firms in the region. One was the assemblers’ growing realization 
of the enormous growth potential of the Asian markets, especially when con- 
trasted with relatively stagnant demand in Japan and in the developed countries 
more generally (e.g., LTCB  1987). Second, South Korea’s  emergence as an 
auto exporter has encouraged Japanese (as well as U.S.) auto makers to view 
the region as a potential source of vehicles and components for small car and 
developing country market niches.I9 The yen appreciation helped to crystallize 
these other factors. By increasing the import price of Japanese-made compo- 
nents used to produce vehicles in the NICs and ASEAN, this shift encouraged 
further use of locally made parts. It has also resulted in a further extension of 
competition in the Japanese market to the East Asian markets: individual Japa- 
nese assemblers have formed linkages with potential East Asian competitors 
to preempt any linkage between these firms and one of  their competitors in 
Japan (LTCB  1987, 2). Finally, the most recent auto (as well as electronics) 
ports.’* 
18.  According to Plummer and Ramstetter (1992, 272), Japanese affiliates accounted for $1.7 
19. Hyundai  has recently shown signs of  establishing assembly operations in the Philippines 
billion out of the total $5.9 billion in transportation equipment exported from Asia in 1986. 
and Thailand (MACPMA News [Kuala Lumpur], December 1991,9). 180  Richard F.  Doner 
investments in Southeast Asia reflect still another factor-the  shortage of labor 
in Japan (author interviews). 
These factors have prompted the Japanese to deepen and rationalize their 
auto manufacturing operations in the region. Deepening has involved increased 
investments and pressure on local firms to modernize production management. 
If  overseas facilities are to be used for exports as well as domestic markets, 
quality must be raised by replicating Japanese practices. There thus seems to 
be a marked increase in efforts to implement quality circles, to organize suppli- 
ers’ cooperative associations, to improve stamping lines, and so forth in over- 
seas operations (discussed below). 
Note that this process has occurred even in certain of the ASEAN-Four that 
are categorized above as the locus of  simple assembly operations. In Thailand 
the FI inflow has resulted in labor scarcities and encouraged many  firms to 
increase both capital equipment and required skill levels. The importance of 
both local and regional markets has also prompted several Japanese firms, in- 
cluding Kawasaki, to establish design and R&D centers in Thailand and else- 
where in the region.2” 
To rationalize their operations, the assemblers have begun to engage in lim- 
ited cooperation among themselves (e.g., in engine manufacturing in Indonesia 
and Thailand). They have also begun to develop intrafirm production and trade 
arrangements  within the region. Toyota, traditionally the most Japan-bound 
producer, has begun to ship engines from Indonesia to Malaysia, Taiwan, and 
Japan, and from Thailand to Portugal. The firm has also begun to use Southeast 
Asia as a source of  press dies for its regional operations. Toyota’s  Thailand 
complex is slated to play a leading role in the firm’s “planned Southeast Asian 
parts-production network” (Japanese Motor Business, July  1989 and various 
issues). Nissan has announced a regional complementarity program that would 
involve Taiwan selling Nissan auto bodies to Thailand and Thai-made Nissan 
engines going to Taiwan. Nissan’s role would be to coordinate production and 
distribution among the Asian countries, to “administer the traffic” (Asiaweek, 
20.  The Kawasaki case highlights the importance of  regional market niches and the potential 
for intraregional exports. Thai Kawasaki originally produced for the domestic market. After Kawa- 
saki’s  plants in the Philippines and Indonesia ran  into problems, the firm  decided to focus its 
assembly activities in Thailand, where Kawasaki’s facilities had initiated design changes to meet 
the specific requirements of  Thai consumers. These were approved by  the home office in Japan, 
proved quite popular in the Philippines and Indonesia, and have resulted in exports as well as a 
design center in Bangkok (author interviews). Note the following other cases: Isuzu has organized 
a special automotive engineering program with Thailand’s King Mongkut Institute of Technology. 
Toyota plans to invest several hundred million baht to develop technology-transfer programs in 
Thailand; these will include establishing an automotive engineering department at one of Thai- 
land’s universities, setting up auto mechanics courses with local technical schools, opening a Toy- 
ota automotive vocational center to produce qualified mechanics, and granting scholarships to 
university students. Thailand’s Federation of Thai Industries plans to join with Japan’s Keidanren 
to establish an institute to train technicians and engineers. The Japan International Cooperation 
Agency provided financial and technical support for two materials testing centers in Thailand. 
Sony will establish a major research and manufacturing operation in Taiwan (Bangkok Post, vari- 
ous issues). 181  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
October 26, 1986). Mitsubishi has perhaps been the most active by initiating 
intraregional exchanges among its plants and promoting an ASEAN comple- 
mentarity scheme. Honda has recently begun participating in this plan as well. 
Several of these projects involve overseas production and export of old models 
or older technologies (e.g., Mitsubishi is reportedly manufacturing an engine 
in Indonesia that has been phased out of production in Japan). But some also 
involve products used in Japan but cheaper to make in East Asia due to labor 
costs, Such products are not necessarily low-skilled goods. Nippondenso Tool 
and Die is exporting dies from Thailand to Japan due to a shortage of tool-and- 
die experts. 
Many of these plans are still on the drawing board. Some will not come to 
fruition, and those that do will take some time to work out. The precise mix of 
“self-contained”  investments versus “regional division of labor” also remains 
to be seen. It will, however, reflect efforts to reconcile (1) host country factors, 
such as localization policies and particular market characteristics; (2) pressure 
to increase efficiency through regional scale economies; and (3) tensions be- 
tween regional and global strategies of particular firms. Japanese strategies will 
also have to take account of competition from South Korean firms, especially 
Hyundai, whose shrinking North American export markets have prompted new 
efforts to penetrate ASEAN as well as Japanese markets (“Update on South 
Korea”  1990; author interviews). 
These two cases suggest that the impact of Japanese FI  varies with factor 
endowments, entry barriers, and the degree of industry-specific restructuring 
within Japan itself. And they suggest that the emerging hierarchy will not be a 
neat alignment in which the ASEAN-Four are confined to simple assembly 
activities. The fact that much of this new Japanese investment builds on ex- 
isting facilities and interests suggests greater potential  for both  local value 
added and continued tension between individual host country concerns and 
efficiency on a regional level. 
More broadly, it appears that the impact of FI on the comparative advantage 
and exports of  a particular host country is indirect, mediated by host country 
conditions, the shifting comparative advantage of neighbors,  and the ways in 
which host countries screen and manage FI. Before addressing that manage- 
ment process in section 5.5, I turn to the supply side of Japanese investment in 
the Pacific Asian region. 
5.3  Supply of Japanese Investment 
To assess the impact of Japanese FI on East Asia from the supply side, I first 
examine the broad evolution of Japanese investment and the region’s position 
as an investment  target  within  that evolution.  I  then  explore the  domestic 
sources of  Japan’s ability to promote structural changes at home along with 
those it helps to engender abroad. I conclude with an analysis of the important 
institutional components of Japan’s investment presence in the region. 182  Richard F.  Doner 
5.3.1  Patterns of Japanese FI 
Japanese FI in East Asia has passed through three general phases. Until the 
late 1960s, Japanese capital flows to the region were “quiescent and narrowly 
circumscribed” due to Japanese capital controls and pervasive anti-Japanese 
attitudes by  host countries (Encarnation 1992, 167-68).  Capital controls were 
probably the dominant factor here, since the low levels of investments in East 
Asia mirrored the modest global levels of Japanese investments, at least rela- 
tive to those of the United States (tables 5.16 and 5.17). During this period, the 
largest share of Japanese investments in the region was devoted to natural re- 
sources. 
Manufacturing investments jumped in the early 1970s as a result of several 
factors, including domestic capital liberalization, the 197  1 yen  appreciation, 
increased protectionist pressure from the United States, and host country per- 
formance requirements. Although the import and development of  natural re- 
sources continued to play an important role, the expansion of Japanese textiles 
and electronics investments was especially striking (table 5.18).  As host coun- 
tries shifted from import substitution to a greater emphasis on exports, the 
portion of export-oriented investments in labor-intensive  intermediate and final 
products expanded. 
Japanese investments increased in  overall volume during the 1980s, espe- 
cially following the yen appreciation. Indeed, after remaining relatively con- 
stant in 1977-80  and rising slightly in 1980-86, the number of Japanese affili- 
ates worldwide roughly doubled from 1986 to 1988 (Ramstetter 1991b, 30). 
This period also witnessed a more pronounced shift of emphasis from natural 
Table 5.16  Japanese FDI 
1965  1970  ’ 1975  1980  1985  1988 
Percentage of GNP  0.5  0.7  1.7  1.8  3.4  4.0 
Amount (billions of U.S. dollars)  0.4  1.5  8.2  19.5  45.0  113.1 
Source: Balance of  payments figures cited in Yoon (1990, table 1). 
Table 5.17  Components of Japanese FI (percentage) 
Area  Contents  1951-71  1972-80  1981-84  1988 
Developed  Resources  10.3  7.0  2.5  2.9 
Manufactures  9.2  11.4  15.0  16.4 
Other  31.3  26.9  32.6  42.2 
Manufactures  18.2  24.0  12.2  10.4 
Other  16.5  16.2  27.9  22.6 
Amount (billions of U.S. dollars)  4.4  32.1  34.9  186.4 
Developing  Resources  14.3  14.4  9.9  5.5 
Source: Approved investments cited in Yoon (1990, table 2). 183  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
Table 5.18  Distribution of Japanese FI in Manufacturing 
Region 























1980  1985 
12.7  37.6 
1.8  10.3 
9.8  17.1 
1.1  10.2 
7.7  11.9 
14.1  13.9 
9.9  10.9 
30.7  5.2 
19.8  11.6 
5.2  8.8 
Source: Yoon (1990, 1  I). 
Nore: Basic industries include food, textiles, wood and wooden products, pulp and paper products, 
chemicals, iron and steel, and nonferrous metals. 
resources and cheap labor in the developing countries to technology-based, 
market-oriented activities in the developed countries (table 5.17). The global 
percentage of Japanese FI going to the NICs and ASEAN-Four also declined, 
from roughly 26 percent of the 1953-83  cumulative total to 10 percent of the 
1987 figure (table 5.19), as did the percentage going to developing countries 
overall. Nonmanufacturing investments, especially in US.  finance and insur- 
ance sectors, expanded sharply after 1985. 
This picture of a geographical shift away from East Asia and a sectoral shift 
away from manufacturing requires qualification. First, the statistics cited in 
table 5.19 do not cover direct investments by  subsidiaries using money ob- 
tained abroad. Second and more important, the absolute volume of Japanese 
FDI to the NICs and ASEAN countries has expanded rapidly,  averaging a 
$2 billiodyear increase for all eight countries during the 1984-87  period in 
contrast to a roughly $485 milliodyear annual growth for the 195  1-83  period 
(Nakakita 1988, table 3, 308, 310). This reflects not only complementarity in 
industry structures (wages, technological developments, and structural changes 
in Japan). It is also a function of “county bias” factors such as physical prox- 
imity and strategic interests (Pangestu 1987). Further, in the coming years 
Japan may shift the emphasis of its investment from North America and Europe 
to developing Asia. This may  occur for several reasons: Asian investments 
yield relatively high profits; Japan’s “trade friction-avoiding’’ investments are 
largely in place; Japanese firms are worried about economic uncertainty in the 
industrialized countries; and American and European trade blocs could push 
Japan to focus on its own backyard.*’ 
21.  According to a recent Export-Import Bank  of Japan survey, 115 major Japanese firms said 
they would direct 26.1  percent of their foreign investment to the European Community between 
1992 and March 1994. But ASEAN was slated to receive 25.1 percent and the NICs 12 percent 
(Rowley 1992a; see also Rowley 1992b; Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, April 15, 1991, cited 
in Lim 1991, 93). 184  Richard F.  Doner 
Table 5.19  Distribution of Japanese FI (percentage) 
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19.7 
33,364 
Source: Japan Ministry of Finance, cited in Nakakita (1988, tablc 3). 
Third, these figures also exclude overseas activities that do not involve capi- 
tal transfers but do offer host countries the opportunities to capture knowledge- 
based assets. One involves expertise provided to host country importers of pro- 
duction machinery by the machinery makers’ sales engineersz2  There are also, 
as noted earlier, several “intermediate” forms of overseas activity by firms who 
might otherwise engage in more direct FI. These include business tie-ups (co- 
operative links between Japanese and foreign firms involving the acquisition 
and provision of sales rights or brand names), technological tie-ups (the provi- 
sion of new technologies between Japanese and foreign firms for joint efforts 
on R&D), and production  cooperation  (cooperative links involving commis- 
sioned and local production).  The number of  these  intermediate  forms has 
risen, with the greatest gain in technological tie-ups and production coopera- 
tion agreements in the NICs (Nakakita 1988,  table 4). Indeed, there is evidence 
that in South Korea, at least, knowledge-based assets obtained from licensing, 
technical services contracts, turnkey plants, and machinery imports were more 
important than FDI (Westphal, Rhee, and Purse11 1984). The relative weight of 
intermediate forms versus FDI may also vary with industry and, as discussed 
below, with the level of development of local 
22. This is the “major mechanism  for technology acquisition” by Thailand’s largest locally 
owned producer of consumer electronics (Shiowattana 1991, 182-83). 
23.  In South Korea, for example, technical licensing is the major source of foreign technology 
in the general machinery subsector. According to one study, this reflects the subsector’s multitude 
of differentiated products, most of which involve several distinct processes, each of which can be 
licensed. Since no two products may be alike, no two processes or technologies may be alike 
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But it also appears that small and medium-sized Japanese firms (SMEs) pre- 
fer such intermediate forms and that most SME technical tie-ups have taken 
place in the Asian NICs, followed by  ASEAN and the People’s Republic of 
China (Phongpaichit  1988, 305-6).  In addition, the contribution of SMEs to 
Japanese FI in Asia has increased since the mid-1980s. By the end of  1986, 
the yen  appreciation raised the cost of Japanese goods overseas by  some 40 
percent. Supplier firms in Japan were asked to reduce the price of their com- 
ponents-by  30 percent in the case of firms supplying one auto assembler 
(Phongpaichit  1988, 304). This need for price reduction has translated into a 
powerful incentive to shift production overseas. Investments by Japanese SMEs 
may hold further benefits to the extent that these firms bring more standardized 
(and thus more accessible) technology, as well as marketing and managerial 
know-how needed by  host countries. The growing number of investments by 
SMEs from NICs, especially Taiwan and South Korea, reportedly yield similar 
benefits (e.g., Ramstetter 1988). 
The relative reduction of Japanese FDI to East Asia thus seems to have been 
offset by  quantitative increases in investment flows as well as new forms of 
investment and particular knowledge-based assets brought by SMEs from the 
NICs as well as Japan. Two other factors reinforce this admittedly optimistic 
picture. One is the incremental nature of the investment process. A good por- 
tion of Japan’s new investments in East Asia is reportedly going to restructure 
or expand existing investments (“AsiaPacific” 1989,50). This assertion is sup- 
ported by  the fact that the recent expansion of FI does not seem to have been 
a sudden shift caused solely by exchange rate shifts. For many Japanese SMEs, 
the yen appreciation simply accelerated a process, begun some seven or eight 
years before, during which they have collected information, made feasibility 
studies, and monitored economic and political trends in potential overseas in- 
vestment  sites  (Phongpaichit  1988, 304-5).  The  process  of  globalization 
among larger firms was also well under way prior to the yen appreciation (Ko- 
hama and Urata 1988, 330). 
Another factor offsetting the relative reduction in FDI going to East Asia is 
a tendency for Japanese investment, since the yen appreciation, to promote 
both a widening and a deepening of overseas manufacturing facilities. I have 
addressed this issue in  the context of the Thai auto industry. Consider here 
some changes in  the Thai electronics industry (Shiowattana  1991, 186-89). 
Since the exchange rate shift, several Japanese firms have encouraged their 
Thai partners to stop relying on Japanese suppliers and to begin obtaining com- 
ponents from South Korea and Taiwan. They also began to localize production 
tools such as press dies and plastic injection molds. Several have expanded 
their human resource development programs, and at least one has announced 
plans to establish an R&D center to put Japan-based research  findings into 
product  development.  Similar  developments  have  occurred  in  Malaysia 
(Sanger 1991). 
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cooperation with established local firms. Local capitalists often have experi- 
ence in working with foreign partners as well as the financial and managerial 
capacity to take advantage of new resources. The expansion of  linkages be- 
tween Japanese investors and major Thai firms such as Siam Cement, Saha 
Union, and Charoen Pokphand illustrates this point (Phongpaichit  1991, 42- 
43). But, at least in the Thai and Malaysian cases, the pattern extends to many 
medium-sized local firms that, through Japanese technology and local content 
regulations, had already become suppliers of  parts and components to Japa- 
nese firms. 
This pattern of building on existing investments and capacity suggests that 
the production expansion occurring in the ASEAN-Four as a result of new FDI 
may involve more than simple assembly and other low value-added operations. 
Thai firms producing under the country’s largely import substitution regime 
have developed sufficient capacity in processes such as forging, mold making, 
die casting, and plastic injection to supply many parts needed by foreign appli- 
ance, electronics, and auto firms. Thai industries, according to one account, 
“are already well into the phase of developing central industries with satellite 
suppliers, of the type in Japan and Taiwan” (Handley 1991,466). This process 
is certainly not uniform across or within countries. Cross-nationally it varies 
in large part as a function of policies and institutions (discussed below). But it 
may also vary within one industry and one country as a function of differences 
among Japanese investors. Some Japanese firms, for example, have responded 
to the yen  appreciation with a “self-contained” approach (discussed above). 
Others have pursued the “division of labor” type of investment, in which each 
host country facility is part of a global production system and any technology 
introduced is highly fragmented (Shiowattana 199  1,  186-88). 
5.3.2  Domestic Sources of Japanese Structural Change 
Japan’s growing FI  and its support for shifting comparative advantage in 
neighboring  countries has required  structural change at home-shifting  re- 
sources out of declining and into advanced industries. Such change has been 
facilitated by particular political arrangements and high levels of investment 
leading  to constant productivity  improvements, especially in process  inno- 
vation. 
Japanese growth has relied on, among other things, a conservative coalition 
for which small business constitutes an “organized swing constituency,” espe- 
cially in periods of  domestic crisis (Calder 1988, 348). This “structural bias 
toward the small” has entailed government policies promoting sectoral devel- 
opment in industries such as textiles, autos, and machine tools. Also, because 
the Japanese  labor force  has  lacked  strong political  influence,  it  could be 
“eased out of  old industries and retrained  for new ones”  (Cumings [1984] 
1987, 65). Further moderating labor’s response to structural change has been 
the Japanese distribution sector’s capacity to function  as a sponge for labor 
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There are questions as to the strength of these arrangements. The conserva- 
tive coalition, especially the linkages among agriculture, small business, and 
big business, has begun to erode under the pressure of economic liberalization 
(Pempel 1989). To  the extent that this occurs, we may see (1) increased con- 
flicts among and within industries with regard to the adjustment capacity of 
smaller firms, and (2) a more rationalized distribution sector with reduced ca- 
pacity to absorb redundant labor. 
There are also concerns that the replacements of exports by FDI will lead to 
an industrial “hollowing-out” in Japan (Yoon 1990, 18-20).  Growing FI, it is 
argued, has already reduced investment in, orders to, and employment in the 
traditionally most efficient industries such as autos. Although many of the un- 
employed have been absorbed into services and distribution, these are sectors 
with low productivity growth. Furthermore, shifts of production of lower-end 
products abroad will entail a loss of  production experience, a phenomenon 
already apparent in the deterioration of Japan’s tool-and-die-making 
These shifts may also undermine the intraindustry linkages that have supported 
the development of higher-level products. 
A thorough discussion of these concerns is beyond the scope of this paper. 
But if Japan’s automotive, office machinery, computer, and machine tools in- 
dustries relocate 30-50  percent of  their production overseas within the next 
five to ten years, as suggested by  MITI, the political arrangements surrounding 
this relocation will become increasingly important (“Japan’s Drive into Asia” 
1989,50). In section 5.3.3, I explore some of the institutional channels through 
which relocation has occurred. 
5.3.3 
Japanese investment in the Asian region has been facilitated by a relatively 
proactive and institutional approach to regional development by  the Japanese 
government and private sector. In concluding this section, I wish to explore the 
degree to which public and private sector actors in Japan attempt to manage 
shifts in the regional division of  labor and the range of  institutions through 
which they do so. I hope to avoid the pitfalls of  the usual industrial policy 
debate between state- versus market-led explanations of Japanese economic 
success. My argument is not that the Japanese government has determined and 
directed public and private sector activities concerning shifts in the region’s 
division of  labor. Certainly the government has been  important, especially 
since the mid-1980s. But its role has been one of promoting collective action 
toward goals already embraced by the private sector. In addition, private sector 
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24. This is reflected in Toyota’s obtaining an increasing portion of its dies for Asian operations 
from Thai firms, as noted earlier. Nevertheless, Japan continues to produce dies. Chrysler recently 
looked for a die producer to provide the 210 pieces necessary for a model it intended to begin 
making in Thailand. The U.S. price was $35 million, the Thai price $14 million, and the Japanese 
price $10 million. Chrysler officials stated, however, the Japanese price was clearly a giveaway 
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institutions have themselves played important roles in promoting Japan’s over- 
all investment position. 
Ironically, given the region’s importance to Tokyo, a coherent Japanese gov- 
ernment policy toward the developing countries of Asia has been fairly slow 
in coming. Early efforts included ASEAN technology support by the Associa- 
tion for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS) followed trade tensions in the 
mid-l970s, Prime Minister Fukuda’s 1977 pledge of major support to ASEAN 
projects, and Prime Minister Suzuki’s effort to refocus Japanese aid on clearly 
designated priority areasz5  But more focused attention on the region did not 
come until the mid-1980s. By that time, Japan was coming under significant 
pressure from ASEAN countries, then suffering from severe economic slumps, 
to correct trade balances and redirect FI from the United States and Western 
Europe  to  Asia  (Unger  1990a,  1993); Awanohara  1986; Smith  1986). The 
United States was pushing Japan  to stimulate domestic demand and expand 
foreign assistance. Increased protectionism in the United States, while not ne- 
gating the importance of the American market, did encourage the Japanese 
to look to Asia as a way  of  correcting an overreliance on Washington. This 
extended  to  an  explicit  recognition,  at  least  by  MITI,  of  the  need  to  de- 
velop a horizontal division  of labor between  itself and its Asian  neighbors. 
Such an arrangement, it was argued, would encourage the long-range indus- 
trial growth of its neighbors, thereby expanding markets for Japanese manufac- 
tured goods as well as reducing the destabilizing impact of Japan’s economic 
self-sufficiency. 
The yen appreciation, beginning in September 1985, added more immediate 
economic logic to these arguments. MITI calculated that, given exchange rate 
shifts, a given amount of industrial investment overseas would yield more jobs 
and thus create more long-term economic welfare than the same investment in 
Japan (Smith  1986, 56-57).  The result of  these  concerns was a MITI draft 
called the “Project for Comprehensive Cooperation  and Asian Industrializa- 
tion” (also known as the New Aid Plan). The plan drew on extensive discus- 
sions with private sector organizations such as Keidanren, as well as research 
by  government organizations such as the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) and the Institute for Developing Economies. One of its goals was to 
facilitate Japanese domestic restructuring. The other was to provide assistance 
for export-oriented industries in developing Asia, including help in targeting 
particular sectors for development. These may be part of MITI’s efforts to ex- 
tend its industrial planning and coordination activities into foreign economies 
25. The creation of the Thai-Japan Technological Promotion Association (TPA) illustrates one 
type of Japanese response on which subsequent measures have been built. During the outbreak of 
anti-Japanese demonstrations in 1971 and 1972, MITI investigated ways to alleviate the tensions. 
Reportedly on the advice of  the head of  the AOTS, the ministry supported the creation of  an 
institute devoted to technology transfer. The TPA  was established in 1973 and operated with fi- 
nancial support from some one hundred Japanese firms. As a student in Japan during the early 
1970s. the present director of the TPA had participated in anti-Japanese demonstrations in solidar- 
ity with his fellow students in Bangkok (author interview; TPA materials). 189  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
in response to the expansion of Japanese FI and the lack of coherent industrial 
policies in host countries (Wade 1992,290). 
This plan was reportedly never officially adopted, due in part to intrabureau- 
cratic conflicts. The plan was more attractive to MITI than to other agencies 
because it would expand the former’s funds and range of jurisdiction  when 
factors such as private sector strength have weakened its traditional functions 
and leverage (Unger 1990a). But the plan’s central thrust has been carried on 
by  a variety of  measures and state agencies. In Japan these include, among 
others, special Export-Import Bank of Japan loans for Japanese investors going 
abroad (Yoon  1990, 9; Doner  1991, 82), and industry-specific institutions to 
help in domestic restructuring.26  Moreover, efforts at domestic restructuring in 
response to advances in the NICs have been initiated by business associations 
in  industries  such  as  textiles  and  machine  tools  (JICA  1989;  Fransman 
1986a, 171). 
Outside of  Japan, institutional support includes industry surveys, training, 
and development  assistance by  the Japan  International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), the Japan Over- 
seas Development  Corporation, the AOTS, and JETRO. A recent addition is 
the  Japan-ASEAN  Investment  Corporation,  an  organization  funded  by  the 
OECF and designed to channel Japanese FI to worthy projects in ASEAN.*’ 
Although  state or quasi-state agencies,  these  activities often  involve andor 
serve the Japanese private sector. For example, members of the private sector 
do much of  the groundwork for projects to be funded by the Japan-ASEAN 
Investment Corporation. Similarly, in Malaysia a JETRO-sponsored evaluation 
of press-die and precision-molding  capacity made use of Japanese industry 
experts, and in Thailand, JICA arranged for a visit by the founder of the Japa- 
nese mold-and-die association (Tsuruoka 1992; author interviews). The AOTS, 
which began as a pre-World  War I1 center for overseas Asian students, works 
with MTTI to manage the training of overseas buyers and technicians invited 
by Japanese industrialists to familiarize themselves with locally made machin- 
ery.**  Further, many of these activities are industry-specific and result in a very 
impressive level of  information. For example, JETRO and JICA officials are 
26. The Export-Import Bank’s Asia-related activities have shifted over time as a reflection of 
the region’s changing comparative advantage. During 1957-67  and 1968-73,  Asian textiles took a 
dominant portion of the bank’s loans. But in 1974-80,  the portion of loans going to textiles de- 
clined sharply. This reflected the NIC’s movement out of light manufacturing into heavy industry, 
so that 90 percent of the bank’s loans to East Asia went to heavy and chemical industries, compared 
to 7 percent for textiles and sundries (Ozawa 1986). 
27.  I am grateful to David Arase for bringing this organization to my attention. This organiza- 
tion probably had its genesis in an earlier (1981) body known as the ASEAN Finance Corporation, 
established by Japan’s Committee for Economic Cooperation (Keizai Doyukai). 
28. AOTS had enrolled over 27,000 students by  1984. Its trainees first undergo a five-week 
course in Japanese economy, society, culture, and language. They then spend four months in pri- 
vate companies, often the ones with which their own company has formed a joint venture. JICA 
also serves training functions but focuses on preparing employees for work in public enterprises 
and state agencies rather than in private corporations (Koike and Inoki 1990, 64-65). 190  Richard F.  Doner 
probably better informed than most officials in Thailand’s Ministry of Industry 
on the competitiveness of various sectors of Thai industry (Unger 1990a, 27; 
author interviews). 
Finally, a number of private sector organizations have played direct roles in 
supporting this expansion of Japanese investment in Asia. Trading companies 
(sogo shoshas) were traditionally  important sources of  information and  fi- 
nancing  for Japanese  firms making  initial  moves into overseas production. 
With the extensive experience gained by many Japanese firms, as well as the 
need for more direct control in pricing and marketing, the role of trading com- 
panies  (and intercorporate  networks  in  general) has  declined  (Yoon  1990, 
12-13).  Yet sogo shoshas remain important as sources of technical assistance 
and marketing channels for host country firms, and of information to smaller 
Japanese firms beginning overseas  operation^.^^ They are especially important 
in certain industries, such as textiles, and in certain countries, such as Taiwan, 
where they reportedly handle over 50 percent of trade with Japan (Baum and 
do Rosario 1991). And they continue to play a major role in opening up new 
geographical markets, such as Vietnam (Lehner 1992a). 
The overseas branches of Japanese banks fulfill similar information func- 
tions. Also, business groups, or keiretsu, have at times facilitated the overseas 
expansion of firms within the group. This has certainly been the case in the 
auto industry, where Japanese parts and components suppliers have been asked 
by their primary assemblers to establish operations overseas, and where Mit- 
subishi Motors joined Malaysia’s “national car” project in part through the ac- 
tivities of other Mitsubishi firms in Malaysia (Doner 1991). Also, large Japa- 
nese  supermarkets and department stores help Asian producers  to improve 
quality control, place orders, and bypass Japan’s complex distribution system 
(Unger 1990b, 41). 
Business associations have also been active. The Japan Chamber of  Com- 
merce and Industry provides information to Japanese SMEs at home through 
individual trade associations while gathering data in host countries (Phongpai- 
chit  1988, 308). The Mitsubishi  supplier cooperation association  sponsored 
study trips to Southeast Asia when overseas production facilities were being 
considered (Smitka 1991,44). Keidanren, reportedly backed by MITI, has es- 
tablished the Industrial Project Development Corporation, whose function is 
to identify targets for Japanese FL30 A think tank supported by the Japanese 
auto industry is currently undertaking a comprehensive study of present and 
future needs of the Southeast Asian auto industries (author interview). 
The argument here is not that the Japanese government is orchestrating a 
private sector shift to Asia. The consensus of Japanese executives in the auto 
and electronic industries  interviewed  recently  in Tokyo was that MITJ has 
29. Unger (1991~.  41) notes Marubeni’s role in arranging for Japanese technical assistance to 
30.  I am grateful to David Arase for providing this information. 
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pressed Japanese firms to invest in the United States and Western Europe but 
not in East Asia.31  This is to a large degree because such pressure has not been 
necessary. As interviewees noted, economic factors encouraged Japanese firms 
to build on overseas investments and facilities already in place.32  The govem- 
ment has supplied collective goods necessary to reduce risks for such invest- 
ments and encouraged private sector efforts to do likewise. 
These efforts are clearly designed to promote trade and production linkages 
between Japan and its neighbors. Illustrative cases abound: public and private 
sector officials of the Thai textile industry note that JICA proposals for better 
machinery translate into calls for the import of  Japanese equipment (JICA 
1989; author interviews). The Japanese report on the Malaysian die industry 
recommends the adoption of certain grinding techniques that facilitate assem- 
bly into Japanese dies (Tsuruoka 1992, 45). U.S. firms attempting to interest 
Thais in American machinery found that the latter had already adopted Japa- 
nese specifications (author interviews). 
5.4  Institutional Impact of Japan’s “Organized Capitalism’’ 
According to  some observers, Japanese multinationals differ from their 
Western counterparts in their preferences for minority equity arrangements, 
their emphasis on developing countries and standardized industries, and the 
heavy trade orientation of their investments (e.g., Kojima and Ozawa 1986). 
Westem analysts have cast serious doubt on this view, arguing that such differ- 
ences are either exaggerated or tend to disappear as multinationals from both 
countries confront similar economic and political environments (Encamation 
1992; Ramstetter 1991b). 
The one area in which differences do seem to exist involves the institutional 
forms of and supports for Japanese investments discussed in section 5.3.3. In- 
deed, as many have noted, these arrangements suggest the operation of a more 
organized form of  capitalism in Japan than is common in the United States 
(e.g., Noble  1989). Here I wish to explore the possibility that Japanese FI, 
when combined with host country efforts to adopt best practices, can lead to a 
diffusion of  Japanese-style institutions in the region. Rather than a process 
of mechanical replication, the hypothesis to be explored involves an uneven 
tendency toward institutional convergence. This section, which is meant to be 
suggestive, examines the potential for such convergence by focusing on spe- 
cific  institutional arrangements  appearing  in  the  region,  identifying their 
3 1. Interviews conducted in Tokyo, January-February  1992, by Patcharee Thanamai, Thamma- 
sat University, as part of a joint project with the author. 
32.  During the first half of  1986, “the rapidly improving competitive edge of the East Asian 
NICs in industries such as steel and electronics, and even in machine tools, has given rise to  a 
stream of plans for shifting production out of Japan to the countries concerned” (Smith 1986,57). 192  Richard F.  Doner 
sources,  and  exploring possible  causes  for cross-national  variation  in  their 
strength. 
5.4.1  Looking East to “Japan Inc.” 
Unger has argued that “most of  the capitalist countries of East Asia have 
already set about learning from Japan and drawing on Japan’s successful expe- 
rience in devising institutions suited to its developmental goals” (1993, 19). At 
its most general level, this has involved the promotion of public-private sector 
cooperation. South Korea is clearly the most striking and extensive case of this 
pattern (e.g., Ting 1985,77).  Also worth note, however, are efforts by Malaysia 
and Thailand. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir has proclaimed the need 
for a “Malaysia Inc.,” including admonitions to emulate Japan’s work ethic. In 
Thailand, officials of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
joined with  local industrialists to  promote private  sector peak organizations 
and joint public-private sector consultative committees during the governments 
of General Prem Tinsulanond (1980-88;  Jomo 1985; author interviews). Both 
of the efforts have encountered serious political obstacles. In Malaysia, Malay 
antagonism toward Chinese-dominated business undermines real cooperation 
between the Malay-dominated state and local capitalists. In Thailand a more 
fragmented  political arrangement  under General Prem’s  successor seems to 
have stymied the corporatist-like developments of the consultative committees. 
But the efforts seem to have made a difference. Discussions between Malay- 
sian businessmen and government officials at both industry and national levels 
are more extensive than before. And in Thailand, industry’s peak association 
has continued to play a major role in aggregating and articulating the views of 
its members. 
5.4.2  Interfirm Cooperation 
The efforts to promote peak business association  and public-private sector 
linkages described above came from Malaysian and Thai officials. At the sec- 
toral level, however, at least in Thailand, there has also been pressure from the 
Japanese.33  This has involved conditions attached to Japanese industrial sup- 
port. JICA has been a major supporter of  Thailand’s Metalworking and Ma- 
chinery Industries Development Institute (MIDI). MIDI’S  function is to provide 
both technical and organizational support for Thailand’s SMEs. JICA has em- 
phasized the critical role of business associations in Japan’s industrial growth. 
It has arranged for a visit by the founder of Japan’s mold-and-die association. 
And most critically, JICA has informed MIDI that its financial support is to be 
33.  This discussion draws on author interviews and on JICA (1989). Note also a case in which 
Japanese firms demonstrated the utility of cooperation through their own actions overseas: some 
one hundred Japanese companies in Malaysia reportedly agreed, informally, to restrain their com- 
petition for electrical engineers in the country’s tight labor market (Tsuruoka 1991, 52). 193  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
distributed through  such organizations, not through the government. In part 
under this pressure, MIDI sees itself as a sort of midwife whose function is to 
encourage  the  development  of  independent  associations  of  metalworking 
firms. 
The Japanese have also raised the importance of cooperation among firms 
through JICA’s study of the country’s largest industry-textiles  and apparel- 
and, presumably, in other industry studies. In examining Japan’s and Thailand’s 
need for textile restructuring, the report stresses the importance of local indus- 
try associations and “linkage production units,” that is, firms possessing “verti- 
cal links with different industries . . . to improve  . . . information gathering, 
product development, and adaptation to wide variety in small lot production” 
(JICA 1989, A-111-26). 
5.4.3  Trading Companies 
A number of countries in the region have recognized the benefits of Japan’s 
version of the general trading company (GTC) and have attempted to develop 
their own. Here I want to focus briefly on the two most extensive efforts, those 
of Taiwan and South  Both of these cases involved “conscious govern- 
ment attempts to adapt to their respective settings institutional arrangements 
borrowed from Japan” (Fields 1989, 1075). Yet their achievements were quite 
different. Korea’s GTCs grew impressively, rapidly  expanding the country’s 
exports while assembling large, diverse business conglomerates. Taiwan’s ef- 
fort to graft the Japanese institution largely failed. By the mid-1980s, Japanese, 
not Taiwan, trading companies dominated the island’s foreign trade. 
Several factors account for these different outcomes. First, Taiwan GTCs 
encountered significant competition. Rivals included not only local manufac- 
turers, government agencies, and trade associations, but also Japanese trading 
companies, which had free entry to the island and controlled some 50 percent 
of Taiwan’s trade. In South Korea, on the other hand, Japanese trading compa- 
nies were excluded until the 1960s. The two cases also differed with regard to 
support offered by large business groups. Korean GTCs benefited from finan- 
cial support and a reliable source of export products from Korea’s large busi- 
ness groups (chaebol).  Taiwan’s business groups, on the other hand, largely 
ignored the fledgling GTCs. These groups already had internal trading arms 
and  were  largely  based  in  manufacturing,  thus  having  little interest  in  ex- 
panding trading interests. Further, the Taiwan government did little to promote 
group-GTC ties, due to its own fears of business concentration. This stands in 
sharp contrast to South Korea’s approach of development on the basis of large 
firms. Indeed, as Fields stresses, the government  of  Taiwan differed sharply 
from its Korean counterpart in offering “virtually no incentives” (1989, 1087). 
34. On Malaysia, see Jomo (1985). Information on the Taiwan and Korean efforts is drawn 
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5.4.4  Subcontracting 
Japan’s  success  in manufacturing  owes  much to the  strength  of  subcon- 
tracting relationships,  whether between primary  assemblers  and component 
suppliers in autos (Smitka 1991) or between large fiber producers and down- 
stream processors  in textiles and apparel (“A  Japanese Approach to Invest- 
ment” 1991). I know of no study of  subcontracting in the region as a whole. 
But evidence from Thailand, a country with probably average if  not above- 
average levels of subcontracting, suggests that the phenomenon is a fairly re- 
cent one, emerging in the early  1970s as a response  to local content regu- 
lati~n.~~ 
There are also a number of factors impeding the growth of  subcontracting 
in  the region. As noted earlier, the positions of  SMEs relative to dominant 
political  coalitions  helps  to account for the weakness  of  subcontracting in 
South Korea and the Philippines (under Marcos). The predominance of large 
firms in Indonesia probably also discourages subcontracting. In Malaysia, eth- 
nic differences also undermine subcontracting linkages. The Malaysian Minis- 
try of International Trade and Industry has designed a subcontractor exchange 
scheme-a  computerized data base  designed  to  link  small  suppliers  with 
larger primary firms. Yet the Chinese owners of many SMEs are reluctant to 
participate for fear that the data base will be used to force them to “restructure” 
their equity in favor of ethnic Malays. A second illustration: ethnic Chinese 
auto parts firms have refused to accept the Japanese-style  supplier purchase 
agreement designed by Mitsubishi for firms supplying parts to the Malaysian 
national car. Their fear is that ethnic Malay employees of the national car firm 
will use price information from the suppliers to establish new parts firms. 
There are also economic obstacles, even where the political factors are more 
propitious  (Amsden  and  Kim  1986, 119). Subcontracting often  involves a 
small group of large prime contractors amid a galaxy of small satellite subcon- 
tractors. Yet even in South Korea such large production units are just emerging 
in several industries. Based on the Japanese experience, subcontracting also 
seems to require excess demand, pushing prime firms gradually to increase 
their reliance on suppliers. Yet  the problem for many firms in East Asia has 
been excess capacity. Subcontracting also seems to expand when prime con- 
tractors experience labor market rigidities and are not able to shift workers 
among assignments  and extend the workday. Yet  in most East Asian firms 
unions are weak, and there is little ostensible need to rely on subcontractors. 
Finally, sociocultural factors may hinder the expansion of subcontracting in 
the region. As the Japanese experience has shown, trust is critical to subcon- 
tracting. Yet trust is not a strong point in several of the region’s cultures. Many 
35. Dahlman and Brimble (1990,23).  This study found “significant subcontracting activities” 
in textiles, wood products, metal products, machinery,  electronic and electrical products, and trans- 
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have, for example, stressed the tendency to defect from the group in Chinese 
business culture on Taiwan (Fields 1990). In Thailand, a country long known 
for its “loosely structured” social system, Seagate and Sharp abandoned efforts 
to establish links with domestic subcontractors due to a lack of  trust when 
subcontractors released product designs to competitors (Dahlman and Brimble 
1990, 24). 
Despite these obstacles, there are indications that subcontracting linkages 
are becoming stronger in the region. Some pressure is coming from govem- 
ments impressed with the Japanese model and convinced that subcontracting 
is necessary to strengthen local firms and the overall competitiveness of their 
country. The government of Taiwan, for example, has required Toyota to extend 
active support for the local auto parts and components industry as a condition 
of  its operations (LTCB  1987, 8). The Thai Board of  Investments, hardly a 
proponent of industrial policy, is encouraging local subcontracting through the 
Board of Investments Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD; Busi- 
ness Asia, May 27, 1991, 74). 
Democratic and populist pressures may also encourage this development. In 
South Korea, popular opposition to economic concentration and the govem- 
ment’s strategy of building up national champions prompted the Korean state 
to strengthen local subcontractors through measures such as tax incentives, the 
promotion of small-firm cartelization, requirements for frequent payments to 
vendors by  large firms, and a ban on prime contractors’ buying out suppliers 
(Moon 1988). I suspect that this kind of dynamic may emerge in Indonesia, 
where the Suharto government is constantly concerned with ethnic antagonism 
against Chinese-owned conglomerates. 
There may also be situations in which the economic conditions discussed 
above encourage local firms to initiate or support subcontracting on their own. 
This may be the case for Siam Nawaloha, the foundry and casting firm within 
Thailand’s giant Siam Cement group. A number of former employees of this 
firm have left to establish small machine shops close to the firm (author inter- 
views). 
But Japanese firms attempting to expand and improve quality are probably 
the major force promoting subcontracting. Let me conclude this discussion 
with a description of an institutional component of automotive subcontracting 
in Thailand-the  cooperation club. This is the Thai analogue of the suppliers’ 
cooperative association, a critical component in Japanese auto production. The 
associations are groups of auto parts and components suppliers organized by 
assemblers in Japan for purposes of technical, managerial, and, at times, fi- 
nancial support.36  The Thai club described here was initiated by Isuzu. I do not 
know how it compares to those reportedly organized by Nissan, Toyota, and 
36.  The best discussion of  these associations in Japan is Smitka (1991). The following draws 
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Mitsubishi in Thailand. It does, however, conform to the outlines of suppliers’ 
associations in Japan. 
The Isuzu cooperation club is controlled by Isuzu’s purchasing department. 
Its members are those suppliers with a fairly high level of original equipment 
sales to Isuzu. These are the suppliers on whom Isuzu depends heavily  and 
who therefore  share with Isuzu all information  relevant to production  (e.g., 
cost, price, technology,  etc.).  If a supplier is invited  to join, membership is 
essentially compulsory if sales are to be maintained. The club’s activities are a 
combination  of  the social and the professional.  The former include various 
kinds of outings. The latter include the provision of information on issues such 
as projected model changes and quality problems, the organization of quality 
circles and QC competitions, and factory visits among the members. The diffu- 
sion of information is certainly a major objective of the club. But equally if 
not more important is the promotion of trust, a feature emphasized by Smitka 
for the Japanese associations. Trust is, moreover, seen by members as an irn- 
portant and inexpensive method for diffusing information. 
Trust is promoted in part by the assembler’s willingness to provide important 
technical  and managerial  support  in exchange for each supplier’s openness 
with regard to its own operations and its commitment to meet price and quality 
requirements.  But the club also promotes trust among suppliers, even those 
producing the sa.me item, as a way of diffusing best practices. Social outings, 
at first resented by parts makers as sophomoric, gradually became an opportu- 
nity to know and exchange views with other suppliers. QC contests, although 
intensely competitive, also encouraged trust because teams must openly dis- 
cuss their problems and their proposed solutions. 
Factory visits are also important instruments for diffusion of information 
and promotion  of trust. These visits have reportedly  become quite common 
and are appreciated by most concerned. This is significant, since the Thai auto 
parts association had previously failed at a similar attempt, due to mutual sus- 
picions. Obviously some of the success of Isuzu’s efforts is due to the Japanese 
firm’s leverage as major client. But according to interviews, much credit is also 
due to the gradual way  in which the visiting process evolved. The assembler 
encouraged firms to accept visitors from other plants, but recognized and at- 
tempted to deflate concerns about secrecy. Isuzu sent a list of prospective visi- 
tors to the plant to be visited. That plant had the option of  striking a visitor, 
that  is, direct  competitor,  off  the list, Gradually, however,  such exclusions 
ceased. This was in part due to assembler pressure. But to draw on game theory, 
it also reflected changes in the suppliers’ payoff structure. Those interviewed 
talked of being ashamed to refuse to show their plants; they talked of pride in 
being able to impress visitors with innovations and new machinery; and they 
talked of the things they in turn would learn from visiting other plants. Finally, 
they mentioned an added benefit of these visits: the trust that developed helped 
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stopped raiding other members of the club for skilled labor. This was no small 
achievement in Thailand’s very tight labor market, especially for technicians. 
Emphasis on these benefits should not negate the dangers raised by those 
interviewed-namely,  the tendency for Isuzu to get its hands on every aspect 
of  a Thai firm’s operation.  Several Thai businessmen  repeatedly  raised the 
specter of complete Japanese control. On the other hand, the subcontracting 
relationship had clearly provided local firms with managerial and technologi- 
cal assets that would not otherwise have been available. 
There  is clearly  no teleological  process  of  institutional development oc- 
curring in the region. The preceding discussion has indicated a number of fac- 
tors, such as ethnicity, state fragmentation, loose labor markets, and industrial 
organization, that can impede institutional diffusion. But we have also sug- 
gested other factors, not the least of which is the learning effect of Japanese 
practices themselves,  that can encourage such diffusion. Although inconclu- 
sive, the discussion does highlight the importance of research on this question, 
especially  if  such research draws on more explicitly theoretical analyses of 
institutional development in the industrialized countries (e.g., Hirst and Zeit- 
lin 1991). 
5.5  The Demand Side: Host Country Management of FI 
The preceding  sections have painted a relatively  smooth and cooperative 
picture of Japan’s contribution to industrial deepening and interdependence in 
developing Asia. This emphasis may reflect my focus on the post-1985 period, 
when  Japanese firms exhibited willingness to expand overseas  manufacture 
and procurement. Prior to the exchange rate shift, however, Japan was known 
for its relatively low level of overseas production (see, e.g., Encarnation 1992, 
23).  There were, of course exceptions,  such as the textile case. But in many 
other industries the Japanese were often reluctant multinationals, reluctant to 
establish manufacturing facilities and reluctant to share the knowledge-based 
asset components of these investments. 
Further, given the incremental nature of recent FI, it is plausible to expect 
that the countries benefiting the most from the recent expansion are those that 
had been relatively successful at inducing and learning from Japanese FI prior 
to the exchange rate shift. We thus turn to the “demand side” of the equation, 
the ability of host countries to attract and manage FI. Doing so can help to 
explain the relative position of different countries within the emerging regional 
production structures. 
The following discussion, it should be noted, does not apply to host country 
management only of  Japanese FI. But it is relevant to the discussion in that 
Japan is a major investor in each of these countries. Further, the Japanese have 
shown themselves quite flexible in adapting to the region’s range of FI regimes. 
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fully through minority equity, and partly a function of  the institutions noted 
earlier.37 
The discussion also makes certain basic assumptions, one of which is that 
host country policies can in fact influence the volume and composition of FI 
(e.g.,  Haggard  1990, 204-5).  I also assume that each of  the host countries 
considered here is exposed to similar potential “supplies” of FI. Different lev- 
els of development largely reflect national capacities to make use of that invest- 
ment. Finally, I presume that while FI flows are not all that important quantita- 
tively  to  any  of  the  countries under  consideration, with  the  exception  of 
Singapore (table 5.20), each country considers FI an important factor in its 
growth. This is in part because the spillover of knowledge-based assets in FI 
is at least as important for host country economic growth as simple quantities 
of investment funds. But such spillover is neither automatic nor purely techni- 
cal. It requires active institutional support from state and, as I argue below, 
private sector sources. 
Host countries influence FI flows and benefits through three genera1 types of 
policies: property rights, macroeconomic incentives and general development 
strategy, and sector- and firm-specific incentives (Haggard 1990, 192). I shall 
not address the role of property rights. With some exceptions (noted below), 
the developing countries of East Asia have generally shown much weaker na- 
tionalist tendencies toward expropriation or nationalization than seen in Latin 
America (e.g., Kobrin  1984). Variation in property rights thus seems to ac- 
count for little if  any cross-national ability to manage FI. Further, although 
Japanese firms are very aware of political shifts in host countries, their willing- 
ness to invest seems much less dependent than their U.S. counterparts on major 
changes in government and policy commonly subsumed under the term “mac- 
ropolitical risks” (Doner 1991, 93-94). 
The section thus begins with a discussion of the macroincentives of the re- 
gions various economies and then addresses sector-specific FI management 
designed to obtain knowledge-based assets. The section concludes with a brief 
discussion of East Asian regional efforts at FI management. 
5.5.1  General FI Regimes 
Host country FI regimes vary with regard to a combination of factors that, 
taken together, suggest a measure of  openness to and selectivity about FI. 
Openness refers to rules on local equity ownership, profit repatriation, tax in- 
37.  The Japanese tendency to accept minority equity and the US.  tendency to  insist on majority 
ownership have been attributed to different investment foci: the Japanese on traditional industries 
for which Japan  is no longer a low-cost location, the United States on more modem industries 
where American firms maintain monopolistic power. I believe that Japanese equity preferences 
have more to do with the institutional supports discussed above and with the Japanese tendency to 
maintain control through greater numbers of expatriate managers than used by  most U.S. firms. 
See, for example, Stewart (1985, 12-14).  Moreover, Dennis Encarnation has cast doubt on the 
prevailing assumption that Japanese multinationals tend to operate through minority equity. Like 
U.S. firms, the Japanese generally avoid minority shareholdings whenever possible. 199  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
Table 5.20  Macroeconomic Significance of Direct Investment (percentage) 
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Source: Haseyama, Honobe, and O’uchi (1989, table 3). 
Notes:  Producers’ fixed capital formation is defined as follows: South Korea and Singapore: non- 
residential buildings, transport equipment, and other equipment; Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand: 
gross fixed capital formation of private sector; Philippines: private construction and durable equip- 
ment; Indonesia: assumed as 70 percent of gross fixed capital formation. 200  Richard F. Doner 
Table 5.21  Characteristics  of FI Regimes 
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centives, foreign exchange controls, and so forth. Selectivity has to do with 
industry-specific restrictions on foreign operations, and performance require- 
ments on local content, exports, training  of  local replacements, and technol- 
ogy transfer. 
Does any particular combination of these factors seem best suited to derive 
potential  benefits  from FI? Table 5.21 provides  a rough characterization of 
the East Asian  cases with regard  to openness  and selectivity. If  we assume 
(1) higher levels of development for the NICs than for the ASEAN-Four, and 
higher levels for Thailand and Malaysia than for Indonesia and the Philippines, 
and (2)  some linkage between FI and development, then the East Asian cases 
suggest that no particular combination is optimal on its own. Instead, studies 
of national FI regimes suggest that the following factors are necessary for ef- 
fective host country management of  FI: a political  consensus on the part of 
public and private sector interests as to the benefits of FI, open information 
channels between the state and business, clear linkage of investment policy to 
broader development policy, and the existence of a relatively insulated screen- 
ing agency.38  Effective policies designed both to attract and to channel foreign 
firms into priority  areas were evident only in Singapore, South Korea,  and, 
evidently to a lesser degree, Taiwan. Elsewhere, political conditions-ethnic 
tensions (Indonesia, Malaysia), ideological antipathy (Indonesia), extreme rent 
seeking  (Philippines),  and political  fragmentation  (Thailand)-undermined 
the kinds of institutions and development policies necessary for such manage- 
ment. To the degree that Taiwan does not seem to have been as selective as the 
38.  On South Korea see Haggard (1990); Fields (1990);  Mardon (1990); Business Asia (Febru- 
ary 4, 1991,44). On Taiwan see Fields (1990);  Lam (1991); Lim and Fong (1988); Noble (1987). 
On  Singapore see  Haggard (1990); Lim and Fong (1988); Phongpaichit (1991); Business Asia 
(January 22,1990). On Hong Kong see Haggard (1990); Lam (1990). On Indonesia see Phongpai- 
chit (1991); Doner (1991); Hill (1988). On Malaysia see Jomo (1985); Lim and Fong (1988). On 
the Philippines see Lindsey  (1983); Doner (1991); Business Asia (various issues). On Thailand 
see Unger (1990a); Doner (1991); Phongpaichit (1991); Lim and Fong (1988); Business  Asia 
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other two ”3,  we may identify still another factor that can help to account 
for its success-namely,  its promotion of exports. Exports allow host countries 
low-cost access to a wide range of information provided by buyers of exports 
as well as machinery suppliers. This factor clearly operated in the other NICs 
as well (e.g., Westphal, Rhee, and Purse11 1984, 298). 
This macroperspective does not capture the entire picture, however. Even if 
investment flows to areas considered strategic by  host countries, there is no 
guarantee that investment will provide anything but funds and that the spill- 
overs from knowledge-based assets will not be lost. As Fransman notes, factors 
of  production “must not only be purchased on the market at the going rate. 
They must also be ‘brought into the factory gates’ so that inputs may be trans- 
formed into outputs” (1986a, 209). 
Thus even in the NICs, effective public policy at the macrolevel cannot ac- 
count for the largely beneficial impact of FI  and related activities. Also, the 
macroperspective does not account for relatively impressive economic growth, 
including  the  expansion  of  domestic  entrepreneurs,  in  the  less  efficient 
ASEAN-Four (McVey 1992). Although natural resource-based  revenues were 
necessary to the emergence of many of these new capitalists, their growth in 
manufacturing was closely linked to the technical and managerial resources 
provided by  foreign investors. Given the weaknesses of public policy in  the 
ASEAN-Four, understanding more microlevel processes can help to explain 
the transmission of these resources. 
5.5.2  Host Country Investment Management at the Sector and 
Industry Level 
Host country firms can obtain knowledge-based assets from foreign firms 
through a variety of channels. These include joint ventures, “competitive imita- 
tion,”  subcontracting (supplier  and  vendor  development), machinery  pur- 
chases, and intermediate channels such as technology licensing. Regardless 
of the channel, increased local content requirements, common in most of the 
countries under consideration, increase the potential for technological spill- 
overs. The pitfalls of localization requirements are well known, however. They 
often contravene the most basic rules of  comparative advantage, resulting in 
inefficient (protected) local products and very high costs to local consumers. 
To some degree, the weaknesses of localization can be avoided by  localizing 
simpler parts first and gradually moving to higher value-added items. The Phil- 
ippines’ decision to adopt the opposite strategy-to  begin with major func- 
tional components beyond the reach of all local firms-was  an important flaw 
in that country’s auto localization plans (Doner 1991). 
Assuming a realistic localization plan, however, what kinds of measures en- 
courage and enable local firms to become more efficient within local content 
umbrellas? State policies, such as linking foreign exchange allocations to ex- 
port performance, are obviously important. Here I want to emphasize other 
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these challenges are met by  a wide range of  institutions, private as well as 
public. 
Rationalizing 
Industries in developing countries are often characterized by a large number 
of producers in small markets. This market fragmentation can be beneficial: it 
can force local firms to expand production skills and develop “economies of 
scope,” it can generate capacity to service new  market^,'^ it can ensure compet- 
itive pressure, and it can help ensure that local suppliers are not the captive of 
one particular client. But multiproduct firms often encounter real problems in 
production management, and without some minimum demand, firms cannot 
hope to reach scale economies large enough to master relevant production pro- 
cesses and technology  (Prendergast 1990). Thus rationalization-reduction 
in the number of  firms, brands,  and/or  models-is  an  important challenge 
(Markusen 1992,29). 
As illustrated by the auto industry, the East Asian countries have addressed 
this problem with varying degrees of success and through different instruments 
(Doner 1992). South Korea has been the most successful, in part due to state 
mandates such as limits on the number of vehicle assemblers. But what is strik- 
ing, given Korea’s reputation as a strong-state country, is the degree to which 
the country’s rationalization reflected private sector initiatives and bargaining 
between the state and private firms. Perhaps most important has been Hyun- 
dai’s decision to focus on single models (first with the Ford Cortina and subse- 
quently with the firm’s own Pony). Malaysia has also achieved some success 
in reducing brands through a state-led joint venture with Mitsubishi, whose 
tariff preferences effectively excluded other makes from the most popular mar- 
ket niche. Elsewhere in the region, brand reduction efforts have not succeeded. 
But large business groups producing components and parts in Indonesia and 
Thailand have achieved some success in compelling foreign assemblers to ac- 
cept standardized products.  As the localization  process continues and costs 
increase, we can assume that such commonization efforts will intensify. 
Importing  Technology 
I have noted several channels for obtaining foreign technology. The private 
sector plays a much greater role in these processes than is usually acknowl- 
edged in the political science literature. At the same time, successful private 
efforts usually require political, as well as institutional, support from the state. 
The choice of channel through which to obtain knowledge-based assets may, 
as noted  earlier,  vary with  the industry. Public  policy  also  influences this 
choice; Korea’s  efforts to limit Japanese penetration have resulted in greater 
39.  A Malaysian firm, having produced small volumes of  a particular type of glass for several 
years, subsequently began to sell large quantities of this product to the North African replacement 
market (author interview). 203  Japanese Foreign Investment and a Pacific Asian Region 
use of  licensing agreements than elsewhere in the region. But the most im- 
portant influence on the source of foreign technology seems to be the strength 
of local firms. Joint ventures seem to predominate when host country firms are 
seeking to induce new  technologies. Licensing and technical assistance be- 
come more common as local entrepreneurs begin to master technology and the 
technology becomes more standardized.@  Note, however, that this pattern is 
not linear. For example, when Japanese assemblers decided to expand the value 
of  parts obtained in Thailand, a long-standing licensing agreement between 
the major Thai radiator firm and its Japanese licenser changed to a joint ven- 
ture. This certainly reflected the Japanese desire to control the transfer of new 
technology. But this was not a decision imposed on the Thai firm. The latter, 
although concerned about increased Japanese control, faced major investments 
in a new stamping line and in-house die production, and believed that a Japa- 
nese joint venture partner would provide more solid support than would a li- 
censer (author interviews). 
Host country firms have been especially influential with regard to the choice 
of and benefits derived from licensing and technical assistance contracts. Even 
in South Korea, where the Foreign Capital Deliberation Committee monitors 
and approves all technological transfer agreements, there is significant leeway 
for private sector initiative. Unlike other Korean auto firms, Hyundai has truly 
shopped around and diversified its technology  sources. By  1979 Hyundai 
licensed over thirty different technologies. In  some cases the firm looks to 
different sources for the same technology, obtaining fundamental concepts 
from a U.S. firm but then turning to the Japanese for help in practical ap- 
plications. And although it maintains equity links with Mitsubishi, Hyundai 
reserves the right “to compete directly in Mitsubishi’s own markets and to im- 
port technology and parts from Mitsubishi’s competitors” (Amsden and Kim 
1985). 
Private sector decisions as to technology sources seem to have been equally 
important in the Korean heavy equipment industry as well as in the Taiwan 
machine tool industry (Amsden and Kim 1986; Fransman 1986a). Larger Thai 
and Indonesian firms in autos and textiles have also diversified their technology 
sources, in some cases playing Japanese firms off against each other. Some 
firms have also added a dimension that reflects the region’s interdependence. 
They have established technology agreements with overseas Chinese firms, of- 
ten from Hong Kong and Taiwan, who themselves have long operated as sup- 
pliers to or partners with Japanese firms. Such NIC sources allow ASEAN 
firms to obtain technology at significantly better terms than from the Japanese. 
In a variation of this pattern, Lam notes that Taiwan’s small and medium-sized 
electronics  manufacturers initially  benefited  from  “extensive  networks  of 
40. This was  the case, for example, for South Korean firms attempting to  obtain technology 
from the leading Japanese fiber producers, Toray and Teijin, during the 1960s (Tho 1988,395-96). 
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friends and relatives overseas, who helped them market their products and ac- 
quire new technology and knowhow” (1990,33). 
Foreign machinery suppliers are a further important source of  technology 
for host country producers. One of several “specialized technological agents,” 
machinery  suppliers  provide information on issues  such as quality  control, 
equipment maintenance, and process  organization  (Dahlman, Ross-Larson, 
and Westphal 1987, 772). To the extent that such suppliers are not linked to 
Japanese principals, they also offer technology that is cheaper, more acces- 
sible, and more adaptable by East Asian  producer^.^'  Thai textile firms, for 
example, obtained significant amounts of machinery from the People’s Repub- 
lic of China during the 1980s (author interviews, Bangkok, 1992). Quite often 
such machinery is obsolete secondhand equipment from Europe and Japan. 
Obsolescent Japanese machinery  made possible  the initial growth of  Hong 
Kong and Taiwan textile exporters (Lam 1990,33).  Thai auto parts and compo- 
nents producers have developed extensive contacts with secondhand machin- 
ery suppliers in Japan. This has, for example, allowed one Thai firm to develop 
its own boring machines by  using Thai-built and used imported components 
to build the machine around a new boring head purchased from Japan (author 
interview). 
Finally, firms in developing Asia often obtain technology as subcontractors 
to Japanese producers. Such supply relationships, discussed earlier, potentially 
involve the provision of  a wide range of knowledge-based  assets, including 
blueprints, machinery and plant operation, quality control, training in Japan, 
and so forth. But such linkages should be seen less as an institution imposed 
by foreign firms and more as something reflecting host country conditions and 
influencing the decisions of foreign, especially Japanese, firms (e.g., Dahlman 
and Brimble  1990, 23). Indeed, what  is striking in East Asia  is the cross- 
national range of variation with regard to the development of subcontracting 
relations (e.g., Amsden and Kim 1986; Fujimori 1986). To a large degree, this 
variation is the result of differences in economic and political factors noted 
earlier, such as the structure of industrial organization and the role of small 
firms within the state’s basic coalition. 
Education and R&D constitute one final area in which politics interacts with 
private efforts to influence the technology absorption process. Where the state 
provides public goods-type  incentives, we see not only public research insti- 
tutes and quality education but also extensive private sector initiatives. This is 
clearly the case in South Korea, where, for example, all major synthetic fiber 
producers established their own research  institutes by  the end of the 1970s 
(Tho 1988, 397). In Thailand, on the other hand, where textiles and apparel 
41.  A Thai parts-firm director noted that his Japanese licenser constantly pushes for the most 
expensive machinery.  He  admits that such machinery will last for thirty years but searches for 
other machinery in large part because he does not benefit from the low interest rates on industrial 
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constitute the largest manufacturing industry and the principal source of manu- 
factured exports, bureaucratic fragmentation, the lack of public-private sector 
linkages, and the lack of  a coherent R&D policy have blocked the establish- 
ment of a textile research institute proposed by the private sector several years 
ago (see, e.g., Dahlman and Brimble 1990). 
Private sector initiatives themselves, however, are important in several ways. 
First, some firms make use of public sector incentives more than others. Hyun- 
dai Motor Company, in part by  drawing on expertise from other firms in the 
Hyundai group, established a Department of Planning in  1973 and an R&D 
center in 1979 to obtain and adapt foreign technologies at the lowest price. The 
other major firm, Daewoo, has not followed this path (Amsden and Kim 1985; 
Back  1990). Second, there is evidence that R&D initiatives by  large firms, 
such as Siam Cement (Thailand) and Astra (Indonesia), have jumped ahead of 
relatively passive government policies. And finally, as noted earlier, there is 
evidence of Japanese support for an expansion of both public and private sector 
research capacities in Southeast Asia. 
5.5.3  Regional Management of FI 
My emphasis has been on management of FI  at the national level largely 
because  intraregional  investments  have  largely been  a  function  of  market 
forces and private sector preferences operating independently of any organiza- 
tional efforts (Lim 1992). The one partial exception to this pattern illustrates 
both the obstacles to regional investment management and the ways in which, 
however slowly, Japanese and local capital have interacted to create some re- 
gional patterns. These programs, I argue, will encourage the development of a 
regional division of labor. 
The case discussed here involves efforts by  ASEAN to establish an auto 
complementarity program in order to overcome the inefficiencies of production 
for fragmented, small markets. The initial impulse for this project came from 
Ford’s interest in building an “Asian car” during the early 1970s. Ford’s effort 
was defeated in part by Southeast Asian suspicions that such a vehicle would 
simply facilitate the expansion of Ford’s economic empire. Equally important, 
however, were the objections of Japanese firms then in the process of establish- 
ing themselves in the ASEAN  market^.^' 
The complementarity concept was revived in 1976 when a summit meeting 
of the ASEAN heads of state revitalized both private and public sector activi- 
ties in ASEAN. The meeting led to the establishment of  regional industry 
clubs,  the  most  active  of  which  was  the  ASEAN  Automotive  Federation 
(AAF). Subsequent efforts led to the establishment of a program in which par- 
ticular countries would specialize in the production of particular auto parts/ 
components. These products would enjoy tariff exemptions and local content 
42. The emphasis on local  suspicions is found in Young (1986). The emphasis on Japanese 
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accreditation in the other ASEAN member states, thus encouraging their pro- 
duction for the regional market. 
This effort also failed. The member states were not able to agree on levels 
of foreign involvement. They also differed with regard to potential trade imbal- 
ances resulting from the production of higher value-added goods in Singapore, 
say, compared to Malaysia. Indeed, in the late 1970s, the project prompted 
competing engine manufacturing projects in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Phil- 
ippines. These were designed to ensure the position of each country in higher 
value-added products. Also hindering the project were overlapping production 
facilities in the countries. Thai firms were not willing to abandon or diversify 
out of their investments so that Philippine firms could dominate the manufac- 
ture of a particular product. Equally important, however, was Japanese opposi- 
tion. By the late 1970s the Japanese dominated the Southeast Asian markets 
and auto production facilities. They participated in  the regional discussions 
but refused to move forward, citing high transportation costs, intra-ASEAN 
disputes, and the impossibility of one assembler using components made under 
the umbrella of another. 
By the mid-l980s, it had become clear that only a plan based on the strategic 
interests of each assembler, rather than each ASEAN country, would be feas- 
ible. The AAF thus developed a “brand-to-brand” (BTB) proposal. The initial 
Japanese response was largely indifferent, and the plan, along with the AAF, 
lay dormant for several years. 
There has, however, been progress on two fronts. First, as described earlier, 
the deepening and expansion of  Japanese auto production has prompted the 
assemblers to submit firm-specific plans for regional production within a mod- 
ified BTB framework. This is an uneven process, with Mitsubishi taking the 
lead and Indonesia holding back, its government clinging to the objective of a 
completely integrated national auto industry. But it is a first step, and further 
progress will probably occur under the pressure of Japanese attempts to expand 
scale economies. 
The second area of progress-the  ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture program 
(A1JV)-has  the potential to create networks somewhat more independent of 
Japanese production structures. With the failure of  regionwide efforts, local 
entrepreneurs in  1980 began to design a lower-level model of  cooperation in 
the form of a joint venture agreement between interests from at least two differ- 
ent ASEAN members with majority equity from local interests. The products 
of such ventures would enjoy tariff reductions and local content accreditation 
in the countries participating. 
Although just getting started, the program’s smaller scale has provided op- 
portunities for local initiative and participation by non-Japanese firms. The first 
AIJV, for example, involves electrical motorcycle parts and is jointly held by 
Thai and Malaysian interests. Yamaha’s Thai partner initiated the project with 
support from Thailand’s major peak association, the Federation of Thai Indus- 
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the engineering firm of  Siam Cement, Thailand’s largest industrial group, as 
well as several European firms.43 
Several features of these efforts merit note. Most importantly, regional pro- 
grams in the auto industry will continue to follow rather than lead regional 
investment decisions by Japanese firms. However, prior regional and national 
efforts will accelerate and mold those investment decisions. On the regional 
level, it is likely that the BTB plan hastened Mitsubishi’s efforts by establishing 
a rough set of institutional guidelines. On the national level, the Japanese are 
attempting to  reconcile their  regional  plans  with  each country’s existing 
strengths in parts production. It is also possible that the pressure to achieve 
greater economies of scale will lead to more cooperation among Japanese firms 
in the production of major components. The sharing of dieing and casting facil- 
ities for the manufacture of engines in Thailand is one such case (Doner 1991). 
Finally, as ASEAN businessmen emphasize, the very process of attempting 
to  design  a  complementarity scheme encouraged  organizational develop- 
ment-the  growth of assembler and auto parts associations in each country- 
and cross-national contacts among firms. The latter have reportedly led to the 
establishment of some of the AIJVs. 
5.6  U.S. Interests: Implications 
The Pacific Asian region described in this paper is characterized first and 
foremost by  production linkages and shifting comparative advantage. The re- 
gion also exhibits a less developed but potentially important feature, the grad- 
ual diffusion of Japanese-style institutions. But as other papers in this volume 
argue, the region is not a closed trading bloc. With most of the countries in the 
region strongly dependent on Western, especially US., markets, Japan and the 
other countries of the region are part of a triangular trading system. In broad 
terms Japan sells capital goods to the rest of East Asia, the rest of East Asia 
sells finished goods to the United States, and the United States sells raw mate- 
rials to Japan. Japan is a critical contributor to each of  these developments. 
Yet, as captured in Unger’s phrase “Big Little Japan,” Tokyo’s political vision 
does not yet match its impressive economic strength (1993; see also Tama- 
mot0 1990). 
These features-strong  production ties, growing institutional commonali- 
ties, outward trade orientation, and weak political vision by the strongest eco- 
nomic actor-challenge  U.S. corporate interests in the region as well as Wash- 
ington’s broader concerns with economic stability and security. 
5.6.1 
As developing Asia’s dynamic growth becomes more evident, so does the 
declining position of U.S. firms in many (but certainly not all) industries in the 
U.S. Firms in East Asia 
43. On an extensive auto-related AUV undertaken by the  truck  firm DM, see Business Asia, 
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region. Preceding sections of this paper suggest several possible reasons for 
this state of affairs, including (1) host country adoption of Japanese industrial 
standards at odds with U.S. equipment; (2) the establishment of Japanese net- 
works that are difficult to penetrate by outsiders; (3) the lack of  institutional 
supports providing U.S. firms information about local economic and political 
conditions; (4) “country bias” factors such as general lack of information and 
interest about the region on the part of  US.  firms (one Malaysian supplier 
noted that some officials from U.S. auto firms viewed Southeast Asian markets 
as similar to Australia due to physical proximity); (5) short U.S. time horizons 
encouraged by  the need for immediate returns on investment; (6) lack of  fit 
between US.  firms’ mass production emphasis and the need for more flexible 
production in the region’s smaller, fragmented markets; and (7) domestic pro- 
tectionism discouraging U.S. FDI (as in many textile sectors).“ 
Although Japanese investment will most likely dominate capital from other 
sources in the region, there are several reasons to believe that this domination 
need not be so absolute. Anecdotal evidence suggests a strong desire on the 
part of many in the region to moderate the weight of  Japanese capital with 
U.S.  investment. As local firms expand their own bargaining leverage, they 
will presumably improve their capacity to draw on diverse sources of finance, 
technology, and managerial skills. 
U.S. firms can also adopt several measures to improve their position in the 
region. At one level this involves making better use of corporate tie-ups. U.S. 
firms can pursue what one auto parts official termed a “shirttail strategy” in- 
volving joint ventures with Taiwanese firms to break into Japanese supplier 
networks in the region. In a related approach, U.S. firms can follow the ex- 
ample of Dana, an auto components firm with extensive experience in the re- 
gion, by using sales to Japanese transplants in the United States to begin simi- 
lar sales in East Asia (Lehner 1992b). Tie-ups with Japanese trading compa- 
nies coordinating infrastmctural investment offer still another channel (e.g., 
Lehner 1992a). 
Linkages with politically  and managerially  strong host country firms are 
especially important. Dana itself quit Indonesia several years ago, in part due 
to a lack of a good local partner (Doner 1991, 146-48),  whereas Guardian 
Industries, a major U.S. glass producer, succeeded in establishing a Thai pro- 
duction site in part through links to Siam Cement. Such tie-ups require better 
firm-level information, which in turn often hinges on extending the time period 
of  expatriate  managers.  Perhaps more important,  stronger linkages  require 
shifts in U.S. managerial approaches. The simple fact is that many established 
local entrepreneurs, given the expansion of their operations and investments, 
are becoming more choosy about foreign partners. Local capitalists are some- 
44.  Recent articles decrying and analyzing the sources of  US.  weakness in Asia include Lim 
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times hesitant to engage in joint activities with U.S. firms because of the lat- 
ters’ narrow focus on price and delivery. 
According to interviews, several U.S. electronic and auto firms operating in 
Southeast Asia have begun  to address these concerns. They have essentially 
attempted to emulate Japanese-style supply networks by  developing  longer- 
term, trust-based relations with suppliers and clients. Whether such attempts 
succeed depends in large part on support from the home office. But they do 
signify East Asia’s potential as a test site for U.S.  firms attempting to improve 
production management, as well as a base for breaking into Japanese produc- 
tion networks and, potentially, the Japanese market. This is somewhat ironic, 
since Southeast Asia functioned in the 1960s and early 1970s as a test site for 
Japanese auto firms hoping to break into the U.S. market. 
5.6.2  U.S. Economic and Security Interests 
In  a  worst-case  scenario,  an  economically  more  integrated  and  Japan- 
dominated East Asia might prompt a broader U.S. disengagement from the 
region. The demise of an ideological mission for the United States in the re- 
gion, isolationist pressures in the United States, the outbreak of instability in 
other regions, and the weakness  of  U.S. corporate involvement in East Asia 
may all undermine domestic pressure for sustained U.S. involvement. These 
factors may be compounded by U.S.  indignation at the structure of its triangu- 
lar trade with the region and by tensions stemming from a more assertive Japa- 
nese voice  with  regard  to broader  economic  questions.  Japan may  well  be 
“bound by a wilful political innocence  [and] a society devoid of ideas about 
what to give to the world, much less how  to organize it” (Tamamoto  1990, 
494). But that does not preclude a more forceful enunciation of Japanese views 
on issues, such as economic reform, that are relevant to its own economic inter- 
ests (e.g., OECF 1991).  Finally, tensions may increase if East Asian reactions 
to  the  formation  of  North  American  and  European  trading  arrangements 
prompt  regional  trading  arrangements  perceived  as  exclusionary  by  the 
United States. 
Washington’s  disengagement would not only reduce U.S. access to and in- 
fluence over the world’s most important source of economic growth. It would 
also find disfavor with Japan and the rest of the region for at least two reasons. 
A general U.S. withdrawal would weaken the region’s ties with a critical export 
market. More important, it would deprive the region of a moderating influence 
on Pacific Asia’s suspicions of  Japan and thus weaken the broader political 
basis of the region’s growth. Whether countries of the region are able and will- 
ing to influence U.S. policy remains to be seen. One hopeful sign is Japan’s 
recognition of its own  stake in maintaining the international trading and fi- 
nancing system (Rosecrance and Taw  1990). Where and to what extent Tokyo 
will extend such an attitude to regional affairs is yet unclear. But it may well 
be that East Asia’s very ability to encourage a sustained U.S. presence depends 
on a greater leadership role for Tokyo. 210  Richard F.  Doner 
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Comment  Robert E. Lipsey 
As I read this paper, it occurred to me that economists tend to look for, and to 
find, the operations of impersonal forces-the  invisible hand-and  that politi- 
cal scientists tend to look for, and to find, the operations of conscious policy 
carried out by specific actors. 
A basic theme of the paper is that an interdependent East Asian region is 
developing, and that the development is not simply a consequence of economic 
forces, such as trends in income and skill levels that change national compara- 
tive advantages. According to this view,  the interdependent region is being 
constructed by  conscious management of the response to economic develop- 
ments by  governments, by  intergovernmental organizations, and by  private 
companies and organizations representing private companies. Of course, even 
in the economists’ world the invisible hand does not work without individuals 
and enterprises making choices and acting on them. One way of describing this 
paper is that Richard Doner is looking more at these actors and their behavior 
than at the underlying economic changes that are forcing them to act or at the 
outcomes of their actions taken in the aggregate. 
It is not surprising to find that Japanese multinationals are organizing inter- 
dependent operations across national borders. That is what multinationals do. 
It would be interesting to know how these Japanese networks differ from those 
formed by  American or European firms or by  multinationals from developing 
countries, if they differ at all. 
There is quite some discussion in various places in the paper about compara- 
tive advantage. Two kinds of comparative advantage are involved. One is the 
standard comparative advantage of  countries, based on immobile factors of 
production. But the other determinant of direct investment is the comparative 
advantages of a country’s firms, based on firm-specific advantages that are im- 
mobile between firms but mobile within firms across countries. The latter may 
stem from the former, but firms may retain some advantages, particularly those 
based on knowledge or technology, long after their countries have moved on 
to different comparative advantages, perhaps because factor endowments and 
factor prices have changed. And firms may develop advantages based on their 
own  R&D, technology, or marketing skill quite apart from their countries’ 
present or former comparative advantages. 
There is a passing mention in the paper about the replacement of exports by 
foreign investment. The idea of such replacement by foreign direct investment, 
which, from the context, appears to be what is meant here, is highly question- 
able. The major empirical studies I am aware of do not find that such replace- 
ment is a general phenomenon and, more frequently than not, find that such 
investment raises exports. The reason is that the direct investment raises the 
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investor’s market share in the host country and exports of components and of 
other finished products rise. 
The explanation given in this paper of the greater willingness of Japanese 
firms than of American firms to accept minority equity in developing countries 
is an example of  the rejection,  or slighting, of  an explanation in  economic 
terms in favor of one based on institutional preferences. I am not sure such a 
difference between Japanese and American multinationals exists, but if it does, 
there are at least two economic explanations. One is the relative inexperience 
of Japanese firms in direct investment, which might make them more willing 
to accept partners. The other is the relatively low-tech industry composition of 
Japanese direct foreign investment in developing countries. The prevalence of 
100 percent or majority ownership in U.S. foreign direct investment is clearly 
related to the technological level of the industry. To what extent could the dif- 
ference between U.S. and Japanese firms be explained by industry composi- 
tion? Or should the industry composition of investment itself be explained by 
different attitudes toward  the employment of foreigners  and the  leakage of 
technological knowledge? 
The paper argues that the spillover of knowledge to host country firms or 
nationals requires support from the state. There is certainly a large collection 
of regulations aimed at encouraging such spillovers, and I do believe that the 
spillovers are one of the main advantages of direct investment to the host coun- 
try. But I do not know of strong evidence that the regulations have much effect, 
and there must be  some level of regulation that would reduce spillovers by 
discouraging investment. Spillovers may depend more on the capacity of the 
host country to absorb technology than on regulations requiring technology 
transfer. Would a country gain more spillovers by raising the educational level 
of its citizens, by encouraging foreign study by its citizens, or by raising the 
technical level of local firms than by regulating foreign firms? 
The reader’s task is made a little harder by defining “foreign investment” in 
an extremely broad way, to include technology licensing and machinery sales, 
certainly not part of  the economist’s usual  definition.  Both  of  these can be 
arm’s-length transactions involving no control over the use of the techniques 
or machinery, and neither one necessarily involves any transfer of capital. 
There is a brief mention of political risk and of the apparent indifference of 
Japanese firms to it in making their investments. There have been suggestions 
recently that Japanese firms would shun direct investment and joint ventures 
in the states of the former Soviet Union because of fears of political instability. 
Perhaps their orientation toward investing in the United States and Southeast 
Asia, rather than in Latin America or Africa, reflects some concern about polit- 
ical stability. 